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BLOOD, SWEAT, AND TEARS: TOWARD A NEW
PARADIGM FOR PROTECTING DONOR PRIVACY

Kevin Hopkins*

Privacy and property ownership are among the
most fundamental rights that we have as citizens of
this country. Governmental intrusion on either
right runs counter to our tradition of protecting
those rights... [and] should be prohibited except
under the most compelling circumstances.

Arthur Miller1
The quality of one's life changes irrevocably when

something like this [HIV infection] becomes public.
Reason and rational thought are too often waived
out offear, caution, orjust plain ignorance.
2
Arthur Ashe

Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law--Camden; Assistant
Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. This Article was supported by a generous research grant from Dean Robert G. Johnston of The John Marshall Law School. I
acknowledge the helpful comments and support of members of the Second Mid-Atlantic
People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference where the Article was first presented as a
work-in-progress and of the American Bar Association Tort & Insurance Practice Section where the Article was presented at the 1999 American Bar Association Annual
Meeting. In addition to the participants of these meetings, I offer a special thanks to Michael Closen, Anita Allen, Linda Greene, Charles Geyh, Andy Gavil, Gloria Banks,
Yvette Barksdale, Debra Stark, Doris Long, Teresa Wallace, and Lorie Hopkins. I also
thank Paula Lustbader whose insight was invaluable during the final stages of this Article. Finally, I acknowledge the competent research assistance provided by Jeffrey Gentilotti, Steven Hovsepian, Bradley Ulrick and Wendy Morris. This Article is dedicated to
the memory of Dorothy Cirwithian Hopkins, my mother, friend, and hero.
1 Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts,
105 Harv. L. Rev. 427,475 (1991).
2 Arthur Ashe & Arnold Rampersad, Days of Grace 17 (1993). In 1983, tennis legend
Arthur Ashe received HIV-infected blood during open-heart surgery. See id. at 15-16. In
1992, he was forced to reveal his HIV positive status after USA Today threatened to publish a lead it had received concerning his health. See id. at 6-11. Ashe notes that the pa*
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INTRODUCTION

During the early 1980s, the United States faced its first major
health crisis since the emergence of small pox, polio, malaria and
tuberculosis. In 1981, the Center for Disease Control ("CDC") reported the first few cases of persons infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"), 3 a virus that would later be identified
as the cause of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS")
and which would reach epidemic proportions worldwide. 4 By June
1999 in the U.S., a cumulative total of 711,344 men, women and
children with AIDS were reported to the Center for Disease Control. 5 Of the total number of AIDS cases reported, 420,201 individuals have died. 6 Estimates and reports of HIV infections are
equally startling. In 1992, between 650,000 and 900,000 persons
in the U.S. were infected with HIV. 7 By 1996, approximately
700,000 individuals in the U.S. were infected, with 41,000 new
HIV infections reported annually. 8 Finally, the Joint United Naper had placed him in the "unenviable position of having to lie if [he] wanted to protect
[his] privacy." See id. at 7. Mr. Ashe died of AIDS on February 6, 1993. See Robin Finn,
Arthur Ashe, Tennis Champion, Dies of AIDS, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1993, at Al.
3 See Pneumocystis Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30 Morbidity & Mortality WIdy. Rep.
250, 250-52 (1981). HIV manifests itself in several physiological states: "an asymptomatic carrier state, a mildly symptomatic state with transient immunologic abnormalities... and other malignant conditions." Perspectives on the Future of AIDS, 253 JAMA
247, 247 (1985). Although there is a clinical distinction between HIV and AIDS, the distinction is irrelevant in controversies involving the discovery of donor identities and
HIV-related medical information. Therefore, HIV and AIDS may be used interchangeably throughout this Article.
4 See Joint United Nations Programme on HIVIAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update: December 1999, at 3-5, availableat <http://www.unaids.org/hivaidsinfo/documents.html
#wad> [hereinafter AIDS Epidemic Update]. Congress has defined AIDS as: "[a] severe
collapse of the body's natural abilities to fight off infection. AIDS ... is part of a spectrum of progressively more serious illnesses now believed to result from HIV. Generally,
people do not die of HIV infection or the immune deficiency itself, but rather of the socalled opportunistic infections and conditions that arise as the immune system is destroyed by HIV infection." H.R. Rep. No. 511, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 23 (1990). The
most common opportunistic infections are Pneumocystis Carinii (pneumonia) and Kaposi's Sarcoma (a specific skin cancer). See id.
See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Pub. Health Serv., CDC, HIV/AIDS
Surveillance Report 6 tbl. 2 (June 1999) [hereinafter HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report].
This figure includes reported cases from U.S. states, dependencies, possessions and associated nations.
6 Seeid. at 28 tbl. 19.
7 See John M. Karon et al., Prevalence of HIV Infection in the United States, 1984 to
1992, 276 JAMA 126, 128 (1996).
8 See Scott D. Holmberg, The Estimated Prevalence and Incidence of HIV in 96 Large
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tions Programme on HLV/AIDS and the World Health Organization have estimated that approximately 32.4 million adults and 1.2
million children worldwide were infected with HIV by the end of
1999. 9
Nearly two decades after the first reported case of AIDS, only
one percent of all reported AIDS-related cases were the result of
blood transfusions. 10 Despite the relatively small number of reported AIDS-related deaths resulting from blood transfusions,
however, HIV transmission through blood transfusions continues
to remain a legitimate concern.11 First, CDC reports indicate that
the HIV epidemic will remain a national and international health
and public policy concern for years to come. 12 Second, blood
transfusions are critical in saving lives. 13 Third, a latency period
exists where an individual infected with HIV is capable of transmitting the virus but may have no physical symptoms for several
US Metropolitan Areas, 86 Am. J. Pub. Health 642, 650 (1996). Currently, the CDC has
reported a cumulative total of 113,959 HIV-infected adults and children living in the
United States and American territories. See HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report, supra note
5, at 8 tbl. 3.
9 See AIDS Epidemic Update, supra note 4.
10 See HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report, supra note 5, at 12 tbl. 5. As of June 1999, the
CDC reported a cumulative total of 8,430 (1 percent) of all AIDS cases were the result of
blood transfusions. See id. This total includes thirty-eight adults/adolescents and two
children who developed AIDS after receiving blood transfusions that screened negative
for the HIV antibody. See id. An additional thirteen adults developed AIDS after receiving HIV-infected tissue and organs or through artificial insemination. See id. Cf. Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection/AIDS-United States, 1981-1990, 40 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 41, 43 (1991) (where CDC estimates indicated that between 1981 and
1990, 2943 transfusion-related AIDS deaths occurred accounting for 2.9 percent of the
total AIDS-related deaths in the United States). A decrease in the percentage of deaths
resulting from blood transfusions can be attributed to mandatory surrogate testing of
blood and increases in the rates for other exposure categories.
11 Although the risk of HIV transmission of screened blood is minimal, almost all
cases of transfusion-associated HIV infections are the result of blood donated during the
"window period" (i.e., when recently infected donors are infectious but have not developed sufficient levels of antibodies necessary for detection). See U.S. Dep't of Health
and Human Servs., Public Health Serv., CDC, U.S. Public Health Service Guidelines for
Testing and Counseling Blood and Plasma Donors for Human Immunodeficiency Virus
T pe I Antigen, 45 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 1, 1 (1996).
According to the CDC, AIDS will continue to be a public health challenge worldwide in the 21st century. See The HIV/AIDS Epidemic: The First 10 Years, 40 Morbidill & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 357, 357 (1991).
I
See infra text accompanying notes 67-71 (discussing the role of blood transfusions
in the national health care system).
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months or years after being infected. 14 Fourth, there is no cure for
AIDS and no screening device to detect the presence of HIV in the
blood stream. 15 As long as transmission of HIV or any other disease through blood transfusion remains a possibility, there must be
legal measures in place to deal with it.
Due to the incurable nature of HIV and its high mortality rate,
blood banks have faced intense pressure and scrutiny from the
courts and state legislatures when attempting to protect the privacy
of donors in tort litigation by individuals who have received HIVinfected blood.16 Both institutions continue to struggle with the issue of when disclosure of a blood donor's identity, HIV positive
status and other confidential medical information is permissible in
lawsuits against blood banks for negligently providing HIVinfected blood donations. In the typical tort case, the plaintiff
seeks disclosure of the identity of the blood donor and other blood
bank records in order to establish a negligence claim against the
blood bank or the donor. 17 The blood bank, which is usually the
14 Persons infected with HIV range from those who are "asymptomatic" (i.e., having
no signs or symptoms of the disease) to those having severe opportunistic infections and
malignancies. See Alan R. Lifson et al., Progression and Clinical Outcome of Infection
Due to Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 14 Clinical Infectious Diseases 966, 966
(1992). The estimated latency period between exposure to HIV and the onset of symptoms can vary from six months to more than ten years. See Jake Taylor, Comment, Sex,
Lies and Lawsuits: A New Mexico Physician's Duty to Warn Third Parties Who Unknowingly May Be at Risk of Contracting HIV from a Patient, 26 N.M. L. Rev. 481, 484
n. 28 (citing Ron Brookmeyer & Mitchell H. Gail, AIDS Epidemiology: A Quantitative
Approach 11 (1994)).
1
See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ELISA and
Western Blot tests. Each test only screens blood for the presence of the antibody to HIV
and does not detect the virus itself.
16 See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
17 Recipients of HIV infected blood transfusions commonly seek recovery against
blood banks under one of the following theories: (1) breach of warranty; (2) strict liability; and (3) negligence. See Daniel L. Russo, Jr., Comment, Blood Bank Liability to Recipients of HV Contaminated Blood, 18 U. Dayton L. Rev. 87, 89 (1992). See also
Karen Shoos Lipton, Blood Donor Services and Liability Issues Relating to Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 7 J. Legal Med. 131, 132-50 (1986) (discussing general
theories of recovery in AIDS-related litigation); Robert C. Greif, Comment, Hospital and
Blood Bank Liability to Patients Who Contract AIDS Through Blood Transfusions, 23
San Diego L. Rev. 875, 880-81 n.27 (1986) (reviewing cases brought under each of these
theories when plaintiffs had contracted serum hepatitis through blood transfusions). Currently, judicial decisions and legislative enactments have prevented recovery against
blood banks based on all theories except negligence. See Russo, supra, at 89-98. Fortyeight out of fifty states have enacted "blood shield statutes" which protect blood suppli-
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target of these battles, is faced with few alternatives. First, it can
provide the requested information and risk breaching its own policies of privacy and confidentiality towards its donors, ultimately
subjecting it to litigation by the donor. Second, the blood bank can
refuse to provide the information and risk civil action by the plaintiff through a court order to access this information. Even when
ordered by a court to disclose the requested information, however,
blood banks are confronted with the additional issue of limiting
disclosure to the information necessary for the plaintiff to establish
the causal link to the HIV-infected donation while preventing access to other non-HIV-related information.
By default, the blood bank becomes the donor's advocate. In
defending the privacy of its clients, the blood bank may file a motion for a protective order with the court to prevent disclosure of
any information concerning the donor's identity or HIV positive
status in order to protect against "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."'1 8 A trial court then balances the competing interests to be served by granting or denying
discovery. 19
ers from liability against claims for both breach of warranty and strict liability. See id. at
93 n.62 (listing the various state blood shield statutes).
There are two theories of recovery in negligence: donor screening and blood testing.
See, e.g., Hoemke v. N.Y. Blood Ctr., 912 F.2d 550, 552-54 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing
plaintiff's theory of blood bank negligence for failure to employ sufficiently vigorous
methods for screening out high-risk donors); Osborn v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 101, 111-29 (Ct. App. 1992) (discussing plaintiffs theory of blood bank negligence for failing to conduct surrogate testing). However, as a result of the FDA's licensing of the ELISA test in March 1985 and current requirements that all blood be tested for
HIV, chances of a finding of liability for negligent blood testing post-ELISA are remote
and must rest on a claim of incompetence in performing the ELISA test. See Robert K.
Jenner, Transfusion-Associated AIDS Cases, 26 Trial 30, 31-32 (May 1990). Because of
this, the strongest theory for negligence against blood banks lies in donor screening. See
id. at 32.
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Because of the stigma attached to AIDS, persons with HIV
often experience intense discrimination and ostracism. See Michael L. Closen, Introduction: HIV-AIDS in the 1990s, 27 J. Marshall L. Rev. 239 (1994).
19 In applying a Rule 26(c) analysis, the courts have considered and weighed the following interests: (1) the plaintiffs interest in compensation for injury; (2) the donor's
interest in privacy; and (3) society's interest in a safe and adequate blood supply. See
Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533, 535-38 (Fla. 1987). See also W.
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §1, 5-6 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that the purpose of tort law is to compensate plaintiffs for injuries resulting from the
conduct of another); National Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 32702, 32702 (1974) (noting
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During the early stages of blood bank litigation, there were
grave concerns about the modes of HIV transmission. 20 The
courts, when weighing the competing interests of the parties, consistently favored disclosure because of concerns for protecting the
national blood supply. 2' This made both legal and practical sense
when there was no adequate testing mechanism for HIV in donors. 22 Even in those instances where the courts held for the donors, judicial remedies sometimes failed to provide sufficient protection for donor privacy and enforcement against improper uses
of personal and private information. 23 However, in light of the current mandatory surrogate testing of blood, 24 and aggressive Food
25
and Drug Administration ("FDA") monitoring of blood services,
there is no longer a reason to consistently undervalue donor privacy. Furthermore, it is inevitable that new diseases will appear
and jeopardize the safety of the national blood supply in the future.
the safety and adequacy of the blood supply as principal goals in the provision of blood
services); infra Part IV, Section A (discussing the donor's interest in privacy).
20 See infra Part I, Section A (discussing the AIDS crises).
21 See infra note 64.
22 See infra Part I, Section B (discussing the development of surrogate testing).
23 See infra note 171 (discussing a federal district court's response to an abuse of a
discovery order requiring confidentiality).
Tainted blood litigation, however, is symptomatic of a much larger problem: technology and its impact on invasions of privacy. Today, one's blood, urine, breath, fingerprints, credit history, DNA and even consumer preferences are becoming increasingly
accessible in an age of scientific and technological advancements that seem both driven
and determined to place such matters in the public domain. See Michael J. Pelczar, Jr. et
al., Microbiology: Concepts and Applications 350-400 (1993) for a discussion of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), where one's unique genetic material is stored. Unfortunately,
the potential for even greater violations of donor privacy is inevitable as technology increases. The privacy concerns of donors today are no longer limited to only blood donations but now encompass other bodily transfers such as sperm, egg, bone marrow, and
organ donations. As a result of recent advancements in medical technologies and procedures, infectious blood-borne diseases can be transferred indirectly through tissue and
organ transplants. Consequently, claims in negligence arising from these procedures will
alsc implicate judicial consideration of the donor's right to privacy. Because organ and
tissue transfers have only been possible through recent medical technologies, case law in
this area is still developing. Current blood bank-donor litigation may set precedent for
how these cases will be resolved in the future.
24 See infra Part I, Section B. Surrogate testing "is used when there is no direct test
available for detecting the presence of a disease or the antibody generated by the disease." United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 515 (Colo. 1992). It is designed to
detect the presence of factors believed to be statistically linked to the presence of the disease. See id.
25 See infra text accompanying notes 80-85.

HeinOnline -- 7 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 146 1999-2000

2000] Blood, Sweat and Tears: ProtectingDonor Privacy

147

To safeguard donor privacy in future blood bank litigation,
policy makers must take the lead in enacting legislation that will
provide the donor with the maximum protection for privacy but allow the plaintiff access to relevant information necessary to establish her legal claims. 26 In response to these concerns, this Article
advocates that state legislatures adopt an absolute privilege for
blood donors to ensure the adequacy and continuity of the blood
donation process. In suits against blood banks, the Article proposes the adoption of a qualified blood bank-donor privilege to
protect confidential information provided during the course of the
screening process.

I. HIV AND BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS
A. The AIDS Crisis
On June 5, 1981, the CDC and California health care workers
reported the first U.S. cases of the disease that later came to be
known as AIDS. 27 At that time, however, physicians and researchers knew very little concerning the cause and mode of transmission of HIV or the full extent of the effect of HIV on the immune
system. Nor were there any specific tests in existence to determine
evidence of HIV infection in the blood, therefore, making it impossible to detect the presence of the virus within blood dona28
tions.
Between 1982 and 1983, the medical community concluded
that AIDS could be transmitted through the blood stream after no26

In most cases, the plaintiffs have sued the specific blood bank or hospital that pro-

vided the infected blood and not the donor (most likely because the donors have died).
See generally Long v. American Red Cross, 145 F.R.D. 658, 662 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Doe
v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 376-77 (Wash. 1991) (noting that the deceased

donor was not a named party in the suit). But see Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130
F.R.D. 360, 362 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (noting the plaintiffs had decided not to sue the donor

individually).
27 The first reported cases of AIDS in the United States were found in homosexual
men and involved two diseases: pneumocystis carinii (pneumonia) and Kaposi's sarcoma
(a rare skin cancer). See Pneumocystis Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30 Morbidity &
Mortality Wkly. Rep. 250, 250-52 (1981); Kaposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocystis
Pneumonia Among Homosexual Men-New York and California, 30 Morbidity &
Mortality Wkly. Rep. 305 (1981). See also The HIV/AIDS Epidemic: The First 10
Years, 40 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 357 (1991).
28 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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ticing that patients who had received blood transfusions were contracting AIDS. 29 In 1982, after discovering three cases of oppor-

tunistic infections in hemophiliacs who had received clotting factors produced from blood products, and a case of AIDS-like
symptoms presented by an infant who had received multiple blood
transfusions at birth, researchers began to consider the possibility
that HlV could be transmitted through blood. 30 During this period,
the CDC identified four groups at highest risk for developing
AIDS: homosexual males, intravenous drug users, Haitian immi31
grants, and hemophiliacs.
As a result of these findings, the CDC sponsored a meeting to
discuss the status of the nation's blood supply on January 4,
1983.32 The meeting was attended by representatives from the
29 See Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia Among Persons with Hemophilia A, 31 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 365 (1982) (describing three cases of persons with hemophilia who had developed AIDS). See also Possible Transfusion-Associated Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)-California, 31 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly.
Rep. 652, 653 (1982) (where the editorial commentary to the CDC report stated, "[t]he
etiology of AIDS remains unknown, but its reported occurrence among homosexual
men, intravenous drug abusers, and persons with hemophilia A suggests it may be
caused by an infectious agent transmitted sexually or through exposure to blood or blood
goducts").
0See Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia Among Persons with Hemophilia A, supra
note 29; Possible Transfusion-Associated Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS)-California, supra note 29 (reporting that a 20-month old infant had developed
an "unexplained cellular immunodeficiency and opportunistic infection" after receiving a
transfusion of platelet derived from the blood of a male subsequently diagnosed with
AIDS).
31 See Current Trends Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS)United States, 32 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 688, 689 (1984). See also James W.
Curran et al., Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Associated with Transfusions, 310 New Eng. J. Med. 69, 70 (1984). Currently, the CDC has identified the following at-risk groups for adults and adolescents: men who have sex with men (57 percent); those who inject drugs (26 percent); men who have sex with men and inject drugs
(8 percent); those with hemophilia/coagulation disorder (1 percent); those who have heterosexual contact with persons who are members of at-risk groups (10 percent); those
who receive blood transfusions, blood components, or tissue (1 percent); and other risks
not reported or identified (9 percent). See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Pub.
Health Serv., CDC, HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report 14 tbl. 5 (June 1999). Finally, the
CDC has identified the following at-risk groups for children at age thirteen or below:
those with hemophilia/coagulation disorder (3 percent); mothers with HIV or who are at
risk for HIV infection (91 percent); those who receive blood transfusions, blood components, or tissues (4 percent); and other risks not reported or identified (2 percent). See id.
(percentages are cumulative and current up to June 1999).
See HIV and the Blood Supply: An Analysis of Crisis Decisionmaking 70-71 (Lau-
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FDA, the American Red Cross, the American Association of
Blood Banks, the Council of Community Blood Banks, the National Hemophilia Foundation, the National Gay Task Force, and

the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association. 33 On January 13,
1983, the American Red Cross, the American Association of
Blood Banks and the Council of Community Blood Banks issued a
Joint Statement that recommended the increased usage of "autologous blood transfusions" and a more thorough screening of all potential blood donors. 34 Specifically, the Joint Statement made sev-

eral recommendations that were designed to limit the possible
spread of AIDS through blood products. 35 It did not, however,
recommend a routine implementation of laboratory blood testing
36
or the screening of donors on the basis of sexual preference.
Recommendations concerning the discouraging of at-risk group
37
participation in the donation process occurred two months later.
During March 1983, the U.S. Public Health Service Committee and the FDA's Bureau of Biologics issued memoranda to
blood banks and manufacturers of plasma derivatives recommending the use of "self-screening" measures designed to decrease the
collections of blood from individuals known to be at-risk for
ren B. Leveton et al. eds., 1995) (discussing the CDC's public meeting) [hereinafter HIV
and the Blood Supply]. See also United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 514-15
Colo. 1992) (discussing the January 4, 1983 meeting and participants).
3

See Quintana,827 P.2d at 515.

34 Joint Statement on the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Related to
Transfusion, 23 Transfusion 87, 87 (1983) [hereinafter Joint Statement on AIDS]. An
autologous transfusion is one in which the patient provides his or her own blood to be
used in an upcoming surgery. See Jones v. Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Med.,
813 F. Supp. 1125, 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting that autologous transfusion is "banking
one's own blood").
35 See Joint Statement on AIDS, supra note 34, at 87-88. For example, the Statement
recommended a more thorough screening of blood and plasma donors through increased
questioning designed to detect possible exposure to AIDS. See id. See also Quintana,
827 P.2d at 514-15.
36 See Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (D.D.C. 1987) (noting
the Joint Statement did not recommend laboratory screening tests or donor screening on
the basis of sexual preference); Quintana, 827 P.2d at 515 (noting that the Joint Statement suggested that donor screening should include only questions designed to detect
3ossible exposure to AIDS).
7 See Kathryn Glasgow Lotfi, Suppliers of AIDS-Contaminated Blood Now Face Liability, 34 Howard L.J. 183, 188 n.49 (1991) (citing Andrea Rock, Inside the BillionDollar Business of Blood, Money, March 1986, at 152, 153); HIV and the Blood Supply,
supra note 32, at 72-73.
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transmitting HIV. 38 The FDA's memorandum recommended that
blood banks institute additional measures to decrease blood collection from groups at-risk for transmitting AIDS and to create educational programs to discourage at-risk donors from giving
blood. 39 Additionally, the FDA recommended that blood banks
train personnel responsible for donor screening on how to recognize the early signs and symptoms of AIDS,4 0 and that blood

banks begin to distribute pamphlets to donors belonging to highrisk groups. 41 At that time, however, neither the FDA nor the Public Health Organization had recommended surrogate blood testing. 42 Finally, by April 1984, scientists discovered that HIV was
3
the probable cause of AIDS. 4
B. Development of Surrogate Testing
Prior to 1986, blood banks were left alone with the task of
screening potential donors for disease. Donors were excluded only
on the bases of medical histories of exposure to hepatitis, syphilis,
blood disease, tuberculosis, malaria, cancer, heart problems, epilepsy, unexplained weight loss, or the taking of certain medications. 44 Although, blood banks provided potential donors with an
AIDS information sheet describing the risks involved in donating
HIV-infected blood and requiring donors to provide answers to a
45
list of questions designed to obtain the donor's medical history,
blood donations were only screened for hepatitis B, syphilis, and

38 See Quintana, 827 P.2d at 515-16. On March 4, 1983, the Public Health Service
issued recommendations for donor screening that paralleled those issued on March 24,
1983 by the FDA. See Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1052. Specifically, these memorandums
recommended that donor screening include information and questions designed to detect
possible AIDS symptoms and exposure to patients with AIDS. See Quintana, 827 P.2d at
515-16.
39

See Quintana, 827 P.2d at 515-16.

40 Seeid. at516.
41 See Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1052.
42 See Quintana, 827 P.2d at 515.
43 See Kozup, 663 F. Supp. at 1052 (citing Peter J. Fischinger, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome: The Causative Agent and the Evolving Perspective, Current Probs.
Cancer, Jan. 1985, at 1, 4; Perspectives on the Future of AIDS, 253 JAMA 247 (1985)).
44 See Belle Bonfils Mem'l Blood Ctr. v. District Ct., 763 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Colo.
1988). See also Quintana, 811 P.2d at 427 (describing blood bank screening procedures).
45 See Belle Bonfils Mem'l Blood Ctr., 763 P.2d at 1006.
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In 1988, the FDA implemented mandatory testing of all donated blood. 47 By that time, several surrogate screening tests had
been developed to detect the presence of HIV antibodies in the
blood stream. On March 2, 1985, the FDA approved the licensing
of an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay test ("ELISA"). 4 8 On
April 30, 1987, Biotech Research Laboratories received a product

license from the FDA for manufacture of the Western Blot test
kit. 49 Although more costly and less sensitive than ELISA, the
Western Blot test is used to confirm or refute the positive results
of the ELISA. 50 When used together, the ELISA and the Western
Blot tests are considered to be 99 percent effective in detecting
HIV antibodies. 51 Neither test, however, can detect the presence of
HIV during the six to eight-week window period occurring be-

tween the time of the initial HIV infection and the formation of antibodies in the donor's blood.5 2 Recently, however, the FDA has
46 See id.
47 See Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Requirements, 21 C.F.R. § 610.45
(1999) (the regulation was published as a final rule on January 5, 1988 in 53 Fed. Reg.
116).
48 See 50 Fed. Reg. 9909 (1985). See also 50 Fed. Reg. 28477 (1985). The ELISA was
specifically created for screening large amounts of blood donations. See Michael J. Barry
et al., Screening for HIV Infection: Risks, Benefits, and the Burden of Proof, 14 L. Med.
& Health Care 259, 260 (1986). It was designed to create a high number of false positives to provide additional protection of the blood supply. See Taunya Lovell Banks &
Roger R. McFadden, Rush to Judgment: HIV Test Reliability and Screening, 23 Tulsa
L.J. 1, 16 (1987). Although the ELISA test has proven 98.6 percent specific and 97.3
percent sensitive for the detection of antibodies for HIV, it does not ensure against "false
positives." See Stanley H. Weiss et al., Screening Test for HTLV-III (AIDS AGENT)
Antibodies, 253 JAMA 221, 223-24 (1985). It is 100 percent effective when used in conjunction with a second test, the Western Blot Analysis. See Barry, supra, at 260 (noting
that screening tests for HIV are designed to detect serum antibodies produced by the
immune system in response to protein components of the virus and do not directly detect
HIV).
49 See Michael Abramowitz, Rockville Firm's Test Kit for AIDS is Approved, Wash.
Post, May 1, 1987, at Fl.
50 See HIV and the Blood Supply, supra note 32, at 78. The Western Blot test is the
most commonly used confirmatory test for HIV infection and has a 99 percent accuracy
rate. See Barry, supra note 48, at 260; Robert Steinbrook, Cheap, Speedy Test for AIDS
Virus Found, L.A. Times, Feb. 14, 1987, at 1 (noting that the Western Blot has a 99 percent accuracy rate).
51 See Defense Research Institute, Misdiagnosed AIDS Provides New Liability for
Medical Field, AIDS Litig. Rep. 16096, 16096 (Sept. 13, 1996).
52 See HIV and the Blood Supply, supra note 32, at 78. Because neither ELISA nor the
Western Blot detects the presence of HIV itself, there is a "window period" between the
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encouraged all blood banks and hospitals to use exclusively, blood
screened by nucleic acid testing ("NAT") in order to help eradicate
viral infections in the blood supply. 53 NAT can detect tiny
amounts of a virus like hepatitis C or HIV even before the donor's
body has recognized the infection. 54 Although the test is expected
to be capable of eliminating the few HIV cases that result each
55
year from blood transfusions, it is still in the experimental stages.
1I. CIVIL DISCOVERY AND BLOOD BANKS

Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
litigants to conduct broad discovery, including information that
may be inadmissible evidence if it appears "reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. '56 The purpose of
the liberal discovery policy is to assist parties in trial preparation
or settlement of legal disputes and provide trial courts with wide
discretion to manage the process. 57 The scope of discovery, howtime an individual becomes infected with HIV and the body's production of sufficient
antibodies to be detectable with surrogate testing. See id. This period can range between
as short as six to twelve weeks, or as long as six months. See Occupational Exposure to
Bloodborne Pathogens: Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 64004, 64014 (1991) (discussing serological testing for antibodies formed in response to HIV infection). The average incubation period from the time of infection to the AIDS stage of the disease, however, is between eight and ten years. See Dennis Osmond, HIV Disease Progression from Infection
to CDC-Defined AIDS Incubation Period, Cofactors, and Laboratory Markers, in The
AIDS Knowledge Base § 1.7, at 1.7-1-1.7-13 (P.T. Cohen et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994).
53 See Blood Banks Will Begin Gene Testing to Help Increase Safety, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 7, 1999, at A24.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The Rule provides that
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including.., the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter.., if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Id. See also Advisory Note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1946 Amendment) (indicating that
"[t]he purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for facts, the names of witnesses,
or any other matters which may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his
case.").
57 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984); 6 James Wm.Moore
et. al., Moore's Federal Practice § 26.02 (3d ed. 1997) (noting that "[dliscovery serves to
narrow and clarify the issues and ascertain the facts that are actually in dispute and require trial."). See also United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)
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ever, has some limitations. First, as indicated in Rule 26, irrelevant
and privileged information is not subject to discovery. 58 Second,
upon a showing of good cause, a court has broad discretion in limiting or prohibiting discovery of relevant and non-privileged in-

formation in order to prevent "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense ... -59 In determining whether
good cause exists to prohibit discovery of relevant and nonprivileged information, the trial court must weigh the competing
60
interests that would be served by granting or denying discovery.
Federal courts have adopted a strict interpretation of the good
cause requirement and force the party seeking confidentiality to
demonstrate the particular harm that would result if a court declined to grant a protective order.6 1 Although Rule 26 was designed to provide trial courts with the means to minimize the impact of discovery on competing privacy interests, it presumes that
even private information is discoverable unless a movant can
demonstrate a particular harm or injury that would result from disclosure of the requested information.
Trial courts have identified three competing interests when
granting or denying a plaintiff's request for confidential information about the donor in AIDS litigation: (1) plaintiffs interest in
compensation for her injuries; (2) donor's privacy interest in the
nondisclosure of personal information; and (3) society's interest in

(citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)) (noting that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure make a civil trial "less a game of blindman's buff [sic] and more a fair
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.").
58 See supra note 56.
59 Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "Upon motion by a
party or by the person from whom discovery is sought... and for good cause shown, the
court in which the action is pending ...may make any order which justice requires to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden
or expense.... "Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
60 See Richard P. Campbell, The Protective Order in Products Liability Litigation:
Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 771, 775-85 (1990) (providing a survey of
federal case law implementing the balancing process). Specifically, the court must balance the plaintiffs interest in obtaining the information and the defendant's or society's
interest in keeping the information confidential. See Estate of Hoyle v. American Red
Cross, 149 F.R.D. 215, 216 (D. Utah 1993).
61 See, e.g., Smith v. Bic Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 201 (3d Cir. 1989); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 822 F.2d 335, 343 (3d Cir. 1987); Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 129 F.R.D. 483, 484 (D.N.J. 1990).
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maintaining an adequate and safe national blood supply. 62 The
balancing of these interests, however, has not been easy. Federal
and state courts are divided on the scope of discovery in AIDS

cases. On the one hand, several courts have denied the plaintiff access to the donor on the basis of a right to privacy under both federal and state constitutions, society's interest in a safe and adequate blood supply, or a combination of the two interests. 63 On the
other hand, many courts have permitted discovery of donors in
furtherance of the tort law policy of compensating injured victims
and the societal interest in maintaining a safe national blood supply. 64 Finally, several states have enacted statutes designed to pro62 See Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 534-38 (Fla. 1987).
Rasmussen is the landmark case on the issue of discovery of donor identities and confidential information and has set the stage for all subsequent litigation on the issue. In
Rasmussen, the plaintiff was struck by a car while sitting on a park bench. See id. at 534.
During his hospitalization, plaintiff received fifty-one units of blood through transfusions. See id. Approximately one year later, plaintiff was diagnosed as having AIDS and
later died. See id. To demonstrate that the cause of his injury was the medical treatment
he received because of the accident, plaintiff served the defendant blood service with a
subpoena duces tecum requesting "any and all records, documents and other material
indicating the names and addresses of the [51 ] blood donors." Id. The blood service then
filed a motion with the trial court to either quash the subpoena or to issue a protective
order barring disclosure of the identities of the donors. See id. The trial court denied the
motion and required the blood service to furnish the requested information. See id.
On review, the District Court of Appeal applied a balancing test under the Florida discovery rules that considered the plaintiff's interest in discovery of the names of the donors in order to prove the aggravation of his injuries and to allow for compensation, the
donors' privacy interests under both the federal and Florida State Constitution, and the
societal interest in ensuring the safety and adequacy of the nation's blood supply. See
South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 801-04 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985), aft'd, 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987). It concluded that the free flow of donated blood
was of sufficient public importance and when combined with the donors' privacy interests, it "outweigh[ed] Rasmussen's interest in discovering the [donors'] names and addresses." Id. at 804. The Florida Supreme Court later affirmed the District Court of Apeal's use of the balancing test and its reasoning. See Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 538.
See Ellison v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 151 F.R.D. 8, 10-11 (D.N.H. 1993); Estate of Hoyle v. American Red Cross, 149 F.R.D. 215, 217 (D. Utah 1993); Bradway v.
American Nat'l Red Cross, 132 F.R.D. 78, 80 (N.D. Ga. 1990); Doe v. American Red
Cross Blood Servs., S.C. Region, 125 F.R.D. 646, 657 (D.S.C. 1989); Rasmussen, 500
So. 2d at 537-38; Laburre v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 555 So. 2d 1381, 1384-85 (La.
1990); Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (Sup. Ct. 1987); Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419, 425 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Taylor v. West Penn
Hosp., 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178, 180 (Ct. C.P. Allegheny County 1987). But see Coleman
v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 362-63 (E.D. Mich. 1990), affd in relevant
part,979 F.2d 1135 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that the societal interest in the blood supply,
alone, outweighed the plaintiff's discovery needs).
64 See Coleman v. American Red Cross, 23 F.3d 1091, 1096 (6th Cir. 1994); Diabo v.
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tect the confidentiality of donor identities and HIV-related infor-

mation but allow access to the information by plaintiffs upon a
65
showing of compelling need or good cause.

III. THE PROBLEMS IN APPLYING RULE 26(c) IN BLOOD LITIGATION
There are several problems in applying Rule 26(c) and its state

equivalents in blood bank cases. First, the judicial concern in
maintaining a national blood supply that is safe and adequate is no
longer justified as the overriding factor in balancing the competing
interests under Rule 26(c) when current testing technologies already provide the maximum protection possible for blood safety.
Second, because the Rule fosters a policy of liberal discovery, it
inherently favors the plaintiff and fails to provide consistent and
adequate recognition of the donor's privacy interest. Finally, an
Baystate Med. Ctr., 147 F.R.D. 6, 10-11 (D. Mass. 1993); Long v. American Red Cross,
145 F.R.D. 658, 672 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Borzillieri v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 139
F.R.D. 284, 289 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Sampson v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 139 F.R.D.
95, 99-100 (N.D. Tex. 1991); Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 126 (W.D. La.
1989); Mason v. Regional Med. Ctr. of Hopkins County, 121 F.R.D. 300, 303-04 (W.D.
Ky. 1988); Belle Bonfils Mem'l Blood Ctr. v. District Ct., 763 P.2d 1003, 1012-13
(Colo. 1988); Most v. Tulane Med. Ctr., 576 So. 2d 1387, 1388 (La. 1991); Snyder v.
Mekhjian, 593 A.2d 318, 323-25 (N.J. 1991); Arnold v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 639
N.E.2d 484, 494-97 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 609
A.2d 796, 800-02 (Pa. 1992); Gulf Coast Reg'l Blood Ctr. v. Houston, 745 S.W.2d 557,
559-60 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675,
679 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 374-79 (Wash.
1991). See also National Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 32702, 32702 (1974).
65 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 381.004(3)(e)(9)(a) (West Supp. 2000) (allowing the plaintiff
access to HIV-test results and related information under a court order, upon a showing
by the plaintiff of compelling need for the information that cannot be obtained through
other means). See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-665(A),(B)(1) (West 1993); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19a-583 (a)(10)(A) (West 1997); Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, §
1203(a)(10)(a) (1995); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 24-9-47(t)(1)(B), (t)(2) (1995); Haw. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 325-101(a)(11) (Michie Supp. 1999); Iowa Code Ann. § 141.23(1)(g)(1)
(West Supp. 1999); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 214.181(5)(c)(9)(a) (Michie 1999); La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 40:1300.15(B)(1) (West 1992); Me. Rev. State. Ann. tit. 5, § 19203-D(2)(E)
(West Supp. 1999); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.5131(1), (3)(a) (West Supp. 1999);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3701.24.3(C)(1)(b) (Anderson 1999); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, §
7608(a)(1) (West 1993); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:5C-9(a) (West 1996) (court order requiring
showing of good cause); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2785(2)(a) (McKinney 1993); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 12, § 1705(a) (Supp. 1995); Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-36.1(A)(7) (Michie 1997);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.24.105(2)(f) (West Supp. 2000); W. Va. Code § 16-3C3(a)(9)(i) (Supp. 1999). But see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-143(6) (1999); Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 63, § 1-502.2(A)(1) (West 1997) (allowing access through court order but failing to
provide a specific standard for granting access).

HeinOnline -- 7 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 155 1999-2000

156

VirginiaJournal of Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 7:2

application of Rule 26(c) in federal diversity actions has resulted
in inconsistent outcomes in both federal and state courts, thus im66
plicating the Erie Doctrine.
A. Blood Safety is No Longer an OverridingFactor Under Rule
26(c)
An important goal of the national blood policy is to ensure "a
supply of blood and blood products adequate to meet all of the
treatment and diagnostic needs of the population of this country.",67 Within the past fifty years, blood transfusions have saved
millions of lives and have become an "indispensable requirement
for patient care" in the United States. 68 Each year, approximately
12 million blood transfusions are performed in the United States 69
and 70 million units of blood and blood components are transfused
worldwide. 70 Blood transfusions remain critical for71 saving lives
and there is no viable long-term substitute for blood.
During the beginning of the AIDS crisis, trial courts, when determining whether to grant a protective order to blood banks under
Rule 26(c), accorded significant weight to the effect of the disclosure of donor identity and HIV-related information on the nation's
66 See infra Part II, Section C (discussing the Erie Doctrine).
67 National Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 32702, 32702 (1974).
68 S.M. Lewis, How Safe is a Blood Transfusion?, 48 World Health 20, 20 (1995).
Blood transfusions are performed to prevent serious medical complications such as
"shock, cardiac or respiratory arrest, necrosis or tissue damage, and hemorrhage." See
Kathryn W. Pieplow, Comment, AIDS, Blood Banks, and the Courts: The Legal Response to Transfusion-Acquired Disease, 38 S.D. L. Rev. 609, 613 n.17 (1993) (citing
the author's interview with Henry Travers, M.D., Medical Director, McKennan Hospital
Blood Bank, in Sioux Falls, S.D. (Dec. 23, 1992)). Currently, there are only two shortterm substitutes for blood: artificial hemoglobin and fluorocarbon. See id. at 613, n. 17.
69 See Sally Squires, Blood Banks Adopt Stricter AIDS Test, Wash. Post, Apr. 2,
1996, at Z6; Protecting the Nation's Blood Supply from Infectious Agents: New Standards to Meet New Threats: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and
Intergovernmental Relations of the House Government Reform and Oversight Comm.,
104th Cong. 87 (1995) (prepared statement of Kathryn C. Zoon, Director, Center for
Biologic Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration) [hereinafter Prepared
Statement of Kathryn C. Zoon]. Much of the blood donated is processed into products
such as derivatives, immune globulin (used to prevent infections) and clotting factors
used to treat hemophilia. See id.
70 See HemaSure Plans Product Launch, Membrane & Separation Tech. News, Jan.
1995 (newsletter).
71 See Pieplow, supra note 68, at 613 n.17.
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blood supply.72 The final outcomes in these cases turned on the
courts' conclusions as to which of the remaining interests would
73
further the national blood policy.
The significance of the use of blood and blood products in
medical treatment is unquestionable. Society continues to have a
compelling interest not only in maintaining a safe blood supply
and in maintaining adequate levels of blood at all times. Therefore,
in order to remain viable, Rule 26(c) must continue to promote
both of these interests. Neither goal is furthered, however, when
applying the Rule in blood bank litigation.
Plaintiffs have argued that discovery of donor identities and
HIV-related information about the donor will result in a safer
blood supply.74 The rationale behind this argument is that if donors are aware that their identities could be disclosed in future litigation, then at-risk donors will self-select and opt out of the blood
donation process, therefore making the national blood supply
safer.75 Under this argument, the potential for litigation would
serve as an additional screening device to deter at-risk donors from
giving blood in the future.
Although the safety of the blood supply was a major concern
during the early stages of the AIDS crisis, its significance today
has been greatly diminished. 76 Today, the national blood supply is
the safest that it has ever been at any time during the history of the
United States. 77 Blood donations are now tested for seven different
diseases-an increase from only two during 1981.78
72 See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
73 See Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 126 (W.D. La. 1989) (holding that
discovery of information from the donor concerning the blood bank's screening procedures would ensure blood safety); Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., S.C. Region, 125 F.R.D. 637, 653 (D.S.C. 1989) (recognizing that confidentiality is essential in
maintaining a volunteer blood donation system that can meet society's demands). See
also National Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 32702, 32702 (1974).
74 See Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 132 F.R.D. 78, 80 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
75 See Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 362-63 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
76 It is important to remember that most of the blood bank litigation concerning HIV
infected blood occurred during the heart of the AIDS crisis when its mode of transmission was uncertain, technologies were still developing, and aggressive FDA monitoring
of the blood supply had just begun.
77 See Prepared Statement of Kathryn C. Zoon, supra note 69.
78

Seeid. at93.
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Since 1986, the FDA has significantly increased its oversight
of the blood industry. 79 The FDA has continued to ensure the
safety of blood by its efforts to improve the operation of the existing blood collection process through education, regulatory controls, quality assurance initiatives, and new products.80 Currently,
the FDA's blood safety system consists of five layers that begin at
the blood collection center and extend throughout the manufacture
and distribution of the blood products.81 The FDA performs routine inspections of blood banks in order to monitor their operation
and to verify their adherence to regulations and standard procedures.8 2 During these inspections, investigators monitor the
screening of donors, blood testing, labeling, storage and handling,
record keeping and other practices. 83 When violations occur, the
FDA has the power to issue warning letters or suspend or revoke a
blood bank's license to operate. 84 It may also take legal action
criminal penalties, including
against the violator and issue civil or
85
the seizure or recall of the products.
Both aggressive FDA monitoring of the national blood supply
and recent advances in blood testing technologies have made the
U.S. blood supply one of the safest in the world. 86 Therefore, most
additional benefits from screening that may be derived from the
threat of litigation will be realized87 and accounted for by the more
recent blood testing technologies.
79 See id.
80 Seeid. at 95.
81 First, blood banks are required to perform donor screening by asking donors questions about their health and other risk factors. See id. at 91. Trained personnel screen potential donors and request all donors who may pose health threats, to remove themselves
from the donation process. See id. Second, once the blood is donated, it is tested for
blood-borne agents such as HIV and hepatitis. See id. Third, blood collection establishments are required to keep a list of "deferred donors" to prevent the use of blood given
by these donors. See id. at 92. Fourth, all blood products are quarantined until they have
been properly tested and the donation records have been verified. See id. Finally, blood
collection establishments are required to investigate any breaches of these safeguards
and to correct any deficiencies that are detected. See id.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 See id. at 92-93.
85 See id. at 93.
86 See id. at 90.
87 See id. at 93. Cf. infra text accompanying note 226 (recognizing that screening may
provide critical protection in cases where HIV-infected blood is donated during the win-
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In addition, blood banks have argued that allowing discovery
of donor identities and HIV-related information could result in severe shortages of blood. 88 They contend that the possible threat of
future litigation against donors for providing disease-infected
blood would result in a disincentive to give blood, not only for atrisk donors, but also for the public at large. 89 They argue that application of the Rule could result in a serious disincentive to donate blood, running contrary to the societal interest in maintaining
an adequate blood supply. Under this rationale, only a refusal to
grant discovery under Rule 26(c) would promote the societal interest of maintaining an adequate blood supply.
Despite the fact that there is very little anecdotal evidence to
support this argument, it may have some merit. 90 Current levels of
blood donations in the United States are at an all-time low and experts have predicted that serious nationwide shortages will occur
in the year 2000.91 Although fear of subsequent litigation may
have contributed to these shortages, many blood banks have attributed the current shortages to a lack of enthusiasm by younger
generations of Americans as compared to the enthusiasm of post-

dow period).
88 See e.g., Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 363 (E.D. Mich. 1990);
Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 126 (W.D. La. 1989); Rasmussen v. South
Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla. 1987).
89 See Boutte, 127 F.R.D. at 126. Blood banks have argued that the threat to all volunteer donors of being brought into litigation and subjected to questioning into intimate
areas of their personal lives could seriously affect the supply of blood donations. See
LaBurre v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 555 So. 2d 1381, 1384 (La. 1990). See also Doe v.
American Red Cross Blood Servs., S.C. Region, 125 F.R.D. 646, 653 (D.S.C. 1989) (citing South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985)).
90 See Sampson v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 139 F.R.D. 95, 97-98 (N.D. Tex. 1991)
(recognizing the validity of the public policy interest in maintaining an adequate blood
supply but finding no anecdotal or statistical evidence to indicate that voluntary blood
donations had declined as a result of judicial orders and opinions). See also Long v.
American Red Cross, 145 F.R.D. 658, 667-72 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Snyder v. Mekhjian,
593 A.2d 318, 324 (N.J. 1991); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 563 A.2d 531, 537
SPa. Super. Ct. 1989).
1 See Donors Needed to Help Avert Blood Shortages, NY Times, June 28, 1999, at
A12 (noting that approximately 60 percent of Americans are eligible donors yet only 5
percent actually donate). The National Blood Data Resource Center has predicted that in
the year 2000, Americans will donate approximately 11.7 million units of blood, yet
hospitals will need 11.9 million units. See id.
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World War II donors. 92 In light of the current shortages of the nation's blood supply, however, any application of Rule 26(c) that
could even remotely result in an additional disincentive to give
blood might seriously undercut the legitimate public interest in
maintaining an adequate blood supply. Assuming that this could
be the case, a denial of discovery under Rule 26(c) is the only application of the Rule that would promote this interest.
Neither a safe blood supply nor the maintenance of an adequate level of blood is sufficient justification for allowing discovery of donor identities and H1V-related information under Rule
26(c). Therefore, the societal interest in maintaining the integrity
of the blood supply should no longer be used as the decisive and
overriding factor to tip the balance in favor of either the plaintiff
or donor's interests. Consequently, the plaintiff and donor's interests are now at par with each other and should be evaluated accordingly.
B. Rule 26(c) is Pro-Plaintiff
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow litigants broad discovery of all information relevant to the subject matter in a case. 93
For discovery purposes, the relevance standard is broadly and lib94
erally construed, and will vary with the subject matter at issue.
Information will be relevant as long as it is "reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. ' 95 Thus, inherent
in Rule 26 is the presumption that either party is entitled to dis92 Seeid.atA12.
93 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). There are limits on discovery, however. Parties are not
entitled to seek discovery of information that is privileged, irrelevant, or unlikely to lead
to discoverable evidence. See id. See also Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial
Workers Int'l Union, 103 F.3d 1007,1012 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that the district court
erred in requiring a third-party to produce documents that were irrelevant to the suit).
94 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (holding that the discovery rules
are to be given a broad and liberal treatment). The scope of relevance in discovery is
broader than the standard of admissibility of evidence during trial and will include information that may be inadmissible at trial. See United States v. City of Torrance, 164
F.R.D. 493, 495 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that discoverable information does not have
to be admissible at trial); Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 135 F.R.D. 101,
104 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that admissibility at trial is not the standard for measuring
relevancy for discovery purposes).
95 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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cover and access all relevant matters in a case during the discovery
phase.

96

In blood bank litigation involving claims of negligence in donor screening, plaintiffs often argue that discovery of a donor's
identity is essential to demonstrate a blood bank's negligence and
that its actions were the proximate cause of their injuries. 97 Plaintiffs in these cases have argued that discovery of the donor is necessary in order to determine the blood bank's screening procedures
at the time of the donation of HIV-infected blood and whether
those procedures were actually followed. 98 The rationale behind
this contention is that donors are persons with knowledge of the
relevant facts and without such information, plaintiffs will experience difficulty in prosecuting their claims. 99
Clearly, information surrounding the circumstances resulting
in a blood bank's collection and supplying of disease-infected
blood is relevant in any claim against it for negligence in donor
screening. 100 Two viable sources for this information are the blood
bank employee or technician who conducts the donor interview
and the donor. 10 1 Because of the relevance of this information,
plaintiffs enjoy an implicit presumption of access to the donor under Rule 26.
A presumption of discovery, however, raises questions of fundamental fairness when a blood bank moves for a protective order
under Rule 26(c). In balancing the competing interests under this
96

See Long v. American Red Cross, 145 F.R.D. 658, 660 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (recogniz-

ing a presumption that a party may obtain discovery of any information that has some
identifiable relationship with a claim or defense raised by the party); Digital Equip.
Corp. v. Micro Tech., Inc., 142 F.R.D. 488, 490 (D. Colo. 1992) (holding a presumption
exists that all matters relevant to a pending case are discoverable).
97

See Long, 145 F.R.D. at 661; Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360,
361 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
98 See Sampson v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 139 F.R.D. 95, 97 (N.D. Tex. 1991);
Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 124 (W.D. La. 1989); Most v. Tulane Med.
Ctr., 576 So. 2d 1387, 1388 (La. 1991).

99

See Gulf Coast Reg'l Blood Ctr. v. Houston, 745 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. Ct. App.

1988).
100 See Boutte, 127 F.R.D. at 124 (citing Belle Bonfils Mem'l Blood Ctr. v. District
Ct., 763 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1988)).

101

See id. See also Diabo v. Baystate Med. Ctr., 147 F.R.D. 6, 8 (D. Mass. 1993);

Ellison v, American Nat'l Red Cross, 151 F.R.D. 8, 11 (D.N.H. 1993); Doe v. Puget
Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370, 376 (Wash. 1991).
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Rule, the plaintiffs interest in compensation for her injuries can
be coupled with the presumption of access to all information relevant to her pending claim. This could automatically result in providing a court with a sufficient basis for assigning an even greater
value to the plaintiffs position when weighing it against the donor's privacy interests. Thus, a court could always justify a ruling
in favor of the plaintiff.
As a result of the broad scope of discovery under Rule 26,
blood banks are left with the onus of having to file motions for
protective orders under Rule 26(c). Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a party may not seek to discover information that
is privileged or irrelevant. 10 2 As previously discussed, the circumstances surrounding a blood bank's collection and distribution of
disease-infected blood is relevant to a claim for negligence in donor screening. 10 3 Therefore, the only bases for a blood bank's refusal to comply with a plaintiff's discovery request for the donor's
identity or HIV-related information would be that the blood bank
has either asserted a claim of privilege or has already moved for a
protective order and is awaiting the results.
These arguments do not succeed. First, most courts that have
considered issues of privilege in blood litigation have focused
primarily on the blood bank's claim that information conveyed
and obtained through the donation process should be protected under the physician-patient privilege. These courts have held the
physician-patient privilege inapplicable in this context, however,
mainly because blood banks do not provide medical treatment.104
No jurisdiction to date has recognized a separate blood bank-donor
privilege to protect against disclosure of confidential information
provided by donors during the screening process. Thus, blood
banks have no other recourse but to file for protection under Rule
26(c). By doing this, they are forced to assume the burden of
102 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.
103 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
104 See Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 798 F. Supp. 301, 305 (E.D.N.C. 1992);
Belle Bonfils Mem'l Blood Ctr., 763 P.2d at 1009; LaBurre v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp.,
555 So. 2d 1381, 1383-84 (La. 1990); Snyder v. Mekhjian, 593 A.2d 318, 323 (N.J.
1991); Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419, 423 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Doe v.
Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d at 374.
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task in
showing "good cause" to prevail-an almost impossible
05
light of liberal discovery rules that favor the plaintiff. 1
No court has held that a right to privacy recognized under either federal or state law is sufficient grounds, alone, to deny discovery of a donor's identity or HIV-related information. 0 6 A few
courts, however, have recognized that donors may enjoy an expressed or inherent right to privacy under either the federal or state
constitutions, 107 or on the basis of the physician-patient privilege. 108 Although most courts recognize the donor's privacy interest, they often fail to assign any significant weight to it when balancing the competing interests under Rule 26(c). 10 9 At least two
105 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing "good cause").
106 Cf. Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535-38 (Fla. 1987)
(recognizing a donor's privacy interest under both the state and federal constitutions but
also concluding that disclosure would circumvent the public interest to discourage any
disincentives to volunteer blood donations).
107 See id. at 536. See also Estate of Hoyle v. American Red Cross, 149 F.R.D. 215,
217 (D. Utah 1993) (citing Doe v. American Red Cross, 125 F.R.D. at 652) (recognizing
the donor had a strong interest in privacy under federal common law); Doe v. American
Red Cross Blood Servs., S.C. Region, 125 F.R.D. 646, 650 (D.S.C. 1989) (recognizing
donor privacy under the state and federal constitutions, but holding that the right is not
absolute); LaBurre, 555 So. 2d at 1382 (recognizing the donor enjoyed a right to privacy
under federal and state law); Arnold v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 639 N.E.2d 484, 497
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing the donor enjoyed an inherent right to privacy that
prevented discovery of the donor's identity under both the federal and Ohio constitutions); Doe v. University of Cincinnati,538 N.E.2d at 424-25 (recognizing that the donor
enjoyed an inherent right to privacy under the federal Constitution and under Ohio common law); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 609 A.2d 796, 800-02 (Pa. 1992) (recognizing that the donor's identity may be protected under both the federal and Pennsylvania constitutions but holding the right is not absolute).
108 See Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 870, 876 (Iowa 1983) (holding that although a
bone marrow donor was not an actual patient of the hospital's transplant unit, she enjoyed the rights of a patient); Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476-77 (Sup.
Ct. 1987) (finding the physician-patient privilege applicable to the relationship between a
blood bank and donor); Stenger, 609 A.2d at 803 (noting that donor identity could "potentially be subjected to the privilege").
109 See Belle Bonfils Mem'l Blood Ctr., 763 P.2d at 1012-13 (recognizing the donor's
interest in privacy but affording it no significant weight or discussion). See generally
Borzillieri v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 139 F.R.D. 284, 287-88 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (recognizing that the donor has a federal constitutional right to privacy but holding that a
properly framed protective order would not violate her constitutional right); Bradway v.
American Nat'l Red Cross, 132 F.R.D. 78, 80 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (recognizing the donor's
privacy interest but failing to provide it a significant weight or discussion, or to consider
a federal right of privacy); Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 125 (W.D. La.
1989) (recognizing the donor's interest in privacy but finding that the interests of the parties could be adequately protected under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Most v.
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jurisdictions have refused to recognize a basic right of privacy for
blood donors even under federal law. 110
Because federal and state courts have consistently failed in
recognizing and providing significant weight to the donor's pri-

vacy interest, favorable results for the donor under Rule 26(c)
have been extremely tenuous and for the most part, heavily de-

pendent upon the specific forum with jurisdiction over the case.
C. Rule 26(c) Raises Erie Concerns
In addition, the inconsistent treatment by courts of the donor's
interest in privacy has the potential to implicate and violate the

twin aims of the Erie Doctrine: "discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.""'
In Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins, the Supreme Court, in interpreting Section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, held its pur-

pose was to ensure that "in all matters except those in which some
federal law is controlling, the federal courts exercising jurisdiction
in diversity of citizenship cases would apply... the law of the
State .... ,1112 In short, Erie holds that federal courts must apply
state substantive law and federal procedural law. 1 13 The following
scenarios illustrate the possible Erie implications in blood donor
Tulane Med. Ctr., 576 So. 2d 1387, 1388 (La. 1991) (recognizing the donor's privacy
concerns but failing to afford any significant weight or discussion); Snyder v. Mekhjian,
582 A.2d 307, 313-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), affd, 593 A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991)
(finding that the donor's privacy interest had been adequately protected by the state's
confidentiality of records of AIDS patients thereby avoiding a consideration of a federal
privacy).
Sampson v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 139 F.R.D. 95, 99 (N.D. Tex. 1991)
11- toSee
nrigt
(avoiding consideration of the defendant's federal right of privacy claim and questioning
whether a right to privacy even arises in the context of discovery between nongovernmental parties); Mason v. Regional Med. Ctr. of Hopkins County, 121 F.R.D.
300, 303 (W.D. Ky. 1988) (failing to recognize any claim of a donor's right to privacy
even under federal law).
III Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (discussing the twin aims of Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that "le]xcept in matters governed by
the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the State.")). See also Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 430
(1996) (applying Erie and holding that ignoring an application of the New York standard
to damage awards on claims governed by New York law would result in "'substantial'
variations between state and federal [money judgments]" (internal citations omitted)).
112 Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 72-73.
113 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
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litigation.
First, a few federal courts, when conducting a balancing of the
competing interests under Rule 26(c), have concluded that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure alone are sufficient to protect the
donor's privacy interest and have relied solely upon these Rules in
reaching their decisions. 114 Consequently, these courts have
avoided any consideration of an inherent or expressed right of privacy under either federal or state law. 115 Following this approach,
however, would allow a federal court to conclude that the right of
privacy should be treated as procedural in nature and not substantive, and would present a conflict in situations where a state has
recognized a substantive right of privacy either under state or federal law.' 16
Second, current judicial treatments of blood donation cases
also implicate Erie in situations where federal courts have recognized a substantive right to privacy under federal law, but state
courts have failed to recognize the existence of a right of privacy
under either state or federal law. 117 Under this scenario, a federal
114 See Boutte, 127 F.R.D. at 125; Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125
F.R.D. 637, 650 (D.S.C. 1989). See also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35
n.21 (noting that the protection of privacy is "implicit in the broad purpose and language
of [Rule 26(c)]"). For a further discussion of this point, see Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 427, 465 n.
199 (1991).
115 See Boutte, 127 F.R.D. at 125; Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125
F.R.D. at 650.
116 For example, in Rasmussen, the Florida Supreme Court held that donors enjoy a
right to privacy under both the Florida Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. See Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla. 1987). Following this
approach, a federal district court in Florida could arguably bypass a consideration of the
constitutional question of a right of privacy and could rule that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, alone, are sufficient to protect the donor's privacy concerns. See South Fla.
Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd,
500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987) (where the District Court of Appeals noted that Florida Rule
of Civil Procedure 1.280(c), the state equivalent of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), adequately protected the donor's privacy interest).
117 For example, in Yeager v. Local Union 20, a case involving a false-light privacy
claim, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Ohio does not recognize a false-light cause of
action. See Yeager v. Local Union 20, 453 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ohio 1983). However, in
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., the United States Supreme Court recognized an
Ohio appellant's false-light privacy claim and found for the appellant. See Cantrell v.
Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1974). In a footnote, the Court stated
that "[a]lthough this [was] a diversity action based on state tort law, there [was] re-
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court cannot afford the privacy protection permitted under federal
laws because under Erie, it must rule in a manner consistent with
state law that would typically govern the substantive nature of a
claim. 118
Finally, Erie implications are potentially raised when the state
court has recognized a substantive right of privacy that is based on
federal law, but the federal district in the same state has failed to
recognize a federal right of privacy. 119 This scenario places the
federal district court in the position of having to either conform to
Erie's application of state substantive law (in this case a right that
is bootstrapped to the federal right of privacy), 120 or violate the
121
principle of stare decisis.
At the very least, a Rule 26(c) balancing of the competing interests in blood litigation implicates concerns of federalism and
the Erie doctrine. Therefore, federal and state legislative reevaluation of the continued use of this rule in blood litigation is warranted solely on this basis.
markably little discussion of the relevant Ohio or West Virginia law by the District
Court.... It [was] clear, however, that both Ohio and West Virginia recognize[d] a legally protected interest in privacy." Id. at 248 n.2. Arguably, under this scenario, a federal district court in Ohio would be bound by the Supreme Court's recognition and discussion of false-light privacy, but under Erie would be placed in the position of having to
follow state substantive law on the privacy claim.
118 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 65, 78 (1938).
119 For example, this situation could occur in the State of Texas. In Tarrant County
Hospital District, a case involving the discovery of the donor's identity in blood litigation, the Court of Appeals noted that "[n]either the Federal Constitution nor [the Texas]
State Constitution expressly mentions any right of privacy," but acknowledged, however,
the existence of a right of privacy under federal case law. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v.
Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 678-79 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). The Texas Court of Appeals
then disagreed with the Rasmussen court's finding of a donor's right to privacy under
both state and federal law. See id. at 679. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas in Sampson, however, in considering the same issue, briefly questioned
whether federal constitutional privacy rights even arise in the context of discovery between private parties and avoided a consideration of the defendant's federal right of privacy claim altogether. See Sampson v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 139 F.R.D. 95, 99
tN.D. Tex. 1991).
20 See Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 78.
121 Stare decisis is the policy of courts "to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled
point[s]." Blacks Law Dictionary 1406 (6th ed. 1990). See also State Oil Co. v. Khan,
522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) and noting
that stare decisis "promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of
legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and
perceived integrity of the judicial process.").
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IV. PROTECTION OF DONOR PRIVACY: THE CASE FOR A
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE

A critical review of Rule 26(c) and its application in blood
bank cases indicates the inherent fallacies in relying on the judiciary to provide sufficient protection of donor privacy when balancing the competing interests. Thus, the real issue in determining
whether to grant protective relief for blood banks that oppose disclosing donor identities and HIV-related information should not be
handled through a procedural balancing of the respective interests.
The better approach is one that recognizes the legitimate substantive claims of both plaintiffs and donors, but is mindful of and
sensitive to the societal concerns in furthering the national blood
policy. It should provide the maximum protection possible for policing donor privacy, yet allow the plaintiff access to essential information necessary to establish her legal claim against the blood
bank or donor.
This Part of the Article will analyze the donor's substantive
claim to a right to privacy and the legal basis for its protection. It
will provide an overview of the adoption and use of common law
privileges to protect specific types of relationships where society,
for public policy reasons, has recognized the necessity of confidentiality in maintaining the integrity of those relationships. The
Article will argue that maintenance of the blood bank-donor relationship is critical for the success of the American health care system and that confidentiality is essential for the stability and continuity of the national blood supply. Finally, it will explain why the
blood bank-donor relationship should be accorded protection under privilege law.
A. The ConstitutionalRight to Privacy
1. Judicial Recognition of a Substantive Right
When requesting protection for the donor under Rule 26(c),
blood banks typically contend that the donor's interest in anonymity implicates a right to privacy under federal or state law. 122 They
122 See Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535-36 (Fla. 1987)
(evaluating the blood bank's assertion that the donors rights to privacy were protected by
the state and federal constitutions).
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have argued that disclosure of donor identities in any context involving HIV could be both disruptive and devastating to the individual donor, and lead to discrimination in employment, housing
and medical treatment. 123 Therefore, in balancing the competing
interests involved, the court must determine not only whether a
substantive right to privacy exists, but also the appropriate weight
to afford it.124
The right to privacy is "the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized man."' 125 It is a substantive
right--one that is fundamental and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"' 126 and one that can only be protected through
measures designed to insure confidentiality. 127 The right to privacy, however, is a relatively recent development of the common
law and was first considered in a landmark law review article written by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in 1890.128 In that
article, Warren and Brandeis argued that "[p]olitical, social, and
economic changes entail the recognition of new rights,"'129 and as-

serted that "the individual is entitled to decide whether that which
is his shall be given to the public."' 30 Specifically, the two scholars argued that instantaneous photographs and newspaper publications had "invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic
life,"'131 and believed the law should provide protection against
such intrusions. 132 The current tort of invasion of privacy emanated from the Warren and Brandeis article and was later defined
123

See id. at 537 (citing the district court's characterization of AIDS as the "modem

dal equivalent of leprosy").
12
See supra notes 107, 109-10.
125 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (citing Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting)).
126 The Supreme Court has alluded to the right to privacy as one of those fundamental
rights that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26
19l37).
27 See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 427, 464 (1991).
128 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193 (1890).
129 Id. at 193.
130 Id. at 199.
131 Id. at 195.

132

See id. at 211.
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33
and organized into four distinct categories by William Prosser.1

The federal Constitution does not expressly mention a right to
privacy. 134 In 1928, the Supreme Court examined the first claim
for privacy in Olmstead v. United States, a case based upon a
Fourth Amendment claim against the government for wiretapping.135 In Olmstead, federal law enforcement officers had tapped
the telephones of several persons suspected of conspiring to violate the National Prohibition Act. 136 The defendants objected to the
government's admission of the evidence obtained by the wiretapping on the basis that the government's actions constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 137 The defendants also argued that they enjoyed a right to
the exclusive enjoyment of a telephone conversation free from interference, and that this was a right to privacy. 138 The Court, however, adopted a strict construction of the Fourth Amendment and
139
refused to recognize a right to privacy under the circumstances.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court recognized an
inherent right to privacy emanating from several constitutional
amendments contained in the Bill of Rights. 140 In explaining its
133 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 386 (1960). See also W.
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 849-50 (5th ed. 1984). The
categories include: (1) the intrusions upon an individual's seclusion or solitude, or into
one's private affairs; (2) the public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about a person; (3) publicity that places an individual in a false light; and (4) the appropriation of a
person's name or likeness for the commercial gain of another. See Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 652 (1977) (adopting Prosser's categories).
134 Although the federal Constitution does not expressly provide for a right to privacy,
many states, however, have amended their constitutions to include this right. For example, the Florida Constitution provides: "Every natural person has the right to be let alone
and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided
herein .... Fla. Const. art. 1, § 23. See also Alaska Const. art I, § 22; Ariz. Const. art II,
§ 8; Cal. Const. art. I, § 1; Haw. Const. art. I, § 6; Ill. Const. art. I, § 6; La. Const. art. I, §
5; Mont. Const. art. H, § 10; S.C. Const. art. I, § 10. Idaho and New Mexico have recognized a right to privacy for crime victims during the criminal justice process only. See
Idaho Const. art. I, § 22(1); N.M. Const. art. II, § 24(A)(1).
135 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding that wiretapping was
not a search within the meaning of the 4th Amendment).
136 See id. at 455.
137 See id.
138 See id. at 440.
139 See id. at 465.
140 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965) (recognizing an implied
right to privacy of married persons to use contraceptives).
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decision, the Griswold Court noted that the right to privacy in
marital decisions involving contraceptives emanated from the "penumbras" surrounding the specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights,' 4 ' and held the marital relationship fell within the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental rights under the Constitu2
tion. 14
In subsequent rulings, the Supreme Court has further explained
that the right to privacy is also founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty, 143 and implicates two distinct
interests. 144 First, the right to privacy encompasses an individual's
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. 145 Second, the
right encompasses an individual's interest in independence in
making certain kinds of personal, but important decisions. 146 The
147
former interest is at issue in civil discovery matters.
2. Public Disclosure of Personal Information
In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court considered the privacy
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters in the context of
medical records and examined the potential conflict between a
public agency's statutory right to access the medical records of patients and their constitutional privacy interests. 148 In Whalen, a
group of patients with prescriptions for Schedule 1/ drugs challenged the constitutionality of a New York statute requiring that
141 See id. at 484-85.
142 See id. at 485.
143 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (finding a right of privacy based
upon the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty).
IV See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
145 See id. See also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977)
(reaffirming the existence of a right to privacy in personal information).
146 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600. The court has characterized these decisions as
ones that deal with "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). See
also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153 (holding the right of privacy is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to have an abortion); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568
(1969) (holding that the zone of privacy extends to reading and viewing materials in
one's home); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that the choice to marry
a person of another race lies with the individual and can not be infringed upon by the
state); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding the marital right
to privacy extends to contraceptive use).
147 See Miller, supra note 127, at 464.
148 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-604.
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records be kept of all prescriptions for individuals receiving those
drugs and filed with the State Department of Health. 149 The records included the name, address and age of each patient.150 In
challenging the propriety of the statute, the patients argued that the
151
statute invaded the constitutionally protected "zone of privacy."
Specifically, they argued that the statute infringed upon both their
interest in non-disclosure of personal matters and their autonomy
152
in making personal decisions.
The Court, in reaching its decision, recognized that the constitutionally protected zone of privacy involved both the "individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and.., the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." 153 The Court noted that disclosure of private medical information to doctors, hospital personnel, insurance companies and
to public health agencies was an essential part of modem health
care, even when the disclosure could reflect negatively on the patient. 154 It further stated that requiring disclosure to those agents of
the State responsible for the health of the community did not
"automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy."' 155 The Court held that because the statute included a provision that prohibited the public disclosure of the patient's identity
156
it
and specified security guidelines for its proper administration,
did not present a threat to either of the privacy interests raised that
would establish a constitutional violation. 157 Although the Court in
Whalen found sufficient statutory safeguards already in place to
protect against the public disclosure of the patients' personal information, the court reserved judgment on privacy issues involv-

149
150

See id. at 591-93.
See id. at 593.

151

Id. at598.

152

See id. at 600. The patients argued that recording and storing information concern-

ing an individual's drug use "create[d] a genuine concern that the information [would]
become publicly known and that it [would] adversely affect their reputations." Id. This
would in turn create hesitation for physicians in prescribing medications and for patients
in pursuing medical treatments. See id.
153 Id. at 599-600.
154 See id. at 602.
155 Id.
156 See id. at 594-95.
157 See id. at 600.
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ing the unauthorized exposure of collections of private data. 158
Unlike the Court's clear pronouncements in cases dealing with
the right of privacy in personal decision-making, 159 the Whalen
holding cannot be construed to pronounce a clear rule regarding
the right to privacy in preventing disclosure of personal information.1 60 However, several federal Courts of Appeals in interpreting
Whalen have held that the disclosure of personal information is
constitutionally protected, 161 and have recognized a qualified constitutional right to the confidentiality of medical records and medical communications.' 62 In United States v. Westinghouse Electric
158 The Court reserved judgment on administrative schemes that may contain less
comprehensive security measures against disclosure than under the New York Statute.
See id. at 605-06. See also Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that the Court in Whalen implied that the disclosure of a person's medical records by
or under compulsion of the government might "presumably" invade the substantive due
process
right of privacy).
59
See supra note 146.
160 See Adams v. Drew, 906 F. Supp. 1050, 1054-56 (E.D. Va. 1995) (noting that the
Court's holding in Whalen was not definitive on the issue of a right to privacy in
Sreventing
disclosure of personal information).
61
See e.g., Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that a
transsexual prison inmate has a privacy right of confidentiality in his medical records);
Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a person infected with HIV has a constitutional right to privacy based on Whalen); United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575
F.2d 1119, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding a privacy "ight to confidentiality" based on
Whalen).
162 See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that "[t]he constitutionally protected privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters clearly encompasses medical information and its confidentiality"); F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiffs
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in medical records); Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1322 n.19 (7th Cir. 1988); Doe v. SEPTA, 72
F.3d 1133, 1137 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that medical records are protected under a right
to privacy); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 577; Doe v. City of New York, 15
F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994). But see Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir. 1987)
(describing the existence of the right as an open question); Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d
733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the right). Even Congress has recognized that medical
records and information stand on a different level than that for other relevant information. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose a higher burden for discovery of reports concerning a party's physical or mental condition. Compare Fed. R.
Civ. P. 35 with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b). See also 8A Charles Allen Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2234.1 (3d ed. 1994) (noting that a
Rule 35 motion for an order for a physical or mental examination when the plaintiff has
placed her health in controversy is discretionary upon a showing of good cause). Finally,
medical files are specifically exempted from disclosure under The Freedom of Informa-
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Corp., the Third Circuit held that "[i]nformation about one's body
and state of health is matter which the individual is ordinarily entitled to retain within the 'private enclave where he may lead a private life."' ' 163
Finally, the Second Circuit has construed a right of confidentiality in personal medical information to include information regarding the state of one's health. 164 In Doe v. City of New York, the
court reasoned that there are only a few matters that are as personal as the status of one's health and only a few over which one
would prefer to maintain greater control. 165 The Doe court held
that the privacy interest in this type of information is at its zenith
166
in the context of an individual's HIV status.
In summary, both federal and state courts have recognized that
the disclosure of the donor's identity in conjunction with her HIV
status implicates the privacy interest in avoiding public disclosure
of personal matters. 167 For the most part, these courts have based
their conclusions on the confidential and private nature of medical
records and communications as alluded to in Whalen. 168 The destion Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1989).
163 Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 577 (quoting United States v. Grunewald,
223 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting)). See also Doe v. City of New
York, 15 F.3d at 267 (agreeing that "the right to confidentiality includes the right to protection regarding information about the state of one's health.").
164 See Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d at 267. In Doe, the Second Circuit noted that
the privacy interest in medical information will vary with an individual's condition and
stated:
Clearly, an individual's choice to inform others that she has contracted what is at this point invariably and sadly a fatal, incurable
disease is one that she should normally be allowed to make for herself. This would be true for any serious medical condition, but is especially true with regard to those infected with HIV or living with
AIDS, considering the unfortunately unfeeling attitude among many
in this society toward those coping with the disease.
Id. See also Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 384-85 (D.N.J. 1990) (recognizing that the hysteria that surrounds AIDS extends to the family members of the person suffering with AIDS and holding that disclosure of AIDS is also a violation of their
rivacy).
65 See Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d at 267.
166 See id.
167 See supra notes 106-07, 109.
168 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977) (holding that disclosure of private
medical information to doctors, hospital personnel and insurance companies "does not
automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy"). See supra notes 161-63.
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ignation of HIV status clearly refers to the state of one's health
169
and can only be confirmed through specific medical testing.
Therefore, it would fall within the subsequent judicial interpretations of the individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters as contemplated in Whalen.
B. Privilegesand the Blood Bank-DonorRelationship
The confidential nature of an individual's HIV status seems to
implicate a right to privacy under the federal Constitution. Because disclosure of HIV status continues to provoke hostility, discrimination and intolerance from others, the donor's privacy interest remains compelling, 170 and judicially imposed safeguards to
police this interest often fail in preventing the disclosure of this
personal information and in providing sanctions for its violation. 171 Under the federal discovery rules, if blood banks could
claim a privilege on behalf of donors, then confidential medical
information such as an individual's HIV status would be shielded
from discovery. 172 Thus, the best approach for protecting donor
privacy in the donation process is to create specific legislative
privileges that are designed to promote candor and confidentiality
during the donor screening process and to shield the altruistic donor 173 from subsequent litigation.
1. The Nature and Origin of Privileges
In general, privileges are rules that operate to prevent the revelation of confidential matter within a judicial proceeding. 174 Privileges arise when certain classes of relationships or communica169 See supra text accompanying notes 47-55.
170 See Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d at 267 (noting that an individual who reveals
her HIV status is exposed to discrimination and intolerance). See also Michael L. Closen,
Introduction: HIV-AIDS in the 1990s, 27 J. Marshall L. Rev. 239 (1994).
171 See Coleman v. American Red Cross, 23 F.3d 1091, 1096 (6th Cir. 1994). In
Coleman, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' case
against the donor was unwarranted even after the plaintiffs' attorney, in a previous suit
against the blood bank, had disclosed the donor's identity in violation of a protective order requiring that the donor's identity remain confidential.
172 See supra note 56 (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)).
173 For purposes of this discussion, "altruistic donor" will include the voluntary donor
who unknowingly provides disease-infected blood.
174 See John William Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 72.1 (5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter McCormick on Evidence].
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tions are deemed to be of sufficient social importance to society
that they must be protected. 175 They are evidentiary in nature and
result in making the ascertainment of the truth either more difficult
or impossible in some instances. 176 Privileges operate as impediments to the important truth-seeking function of the legal system
by promoting other but less immediate goals. 17 7 According to

Dean John Wigmore, four fundamental conditions must be met in
order to establish a privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential
to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion
of the community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by
the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 178
Evidentiary privileges originated with the imposition of compulsory process in Elizabethan England. 179 The concept arose
when reliance on witnesses led to the establishment of a universal
duty to testify. 180 In 1577, the first evidentiary privilege to be recognized under English common law was one that protected the at-

175 See id. at § 72. See also Note, Parent-Child Loyalty and Testimonial Privilege, 100
Harv. L. Rev. 910, 911 (1987).
176 See McCormick on Evidence, supra note 174, at § 72. See also Developments in
the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1450, 1454 (1985) [hereinafter
Privileged Communications] (noting that "privileges expressly subordinate the goal of
truth seeking to other societal interests").
177 See generally Privileged Communications, supra note 176, at 1454-63 (discussing
an overview of the historical evolution of American privilege law).
178 See 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2285, at 527
(John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
179 See Privileged Communications, supra note 176, at 1455
180 See id. (citing Act for Punishment of Such as Shall Procure or Commit Any Wilful
Perjury, 1562, 5 Eliz. I, ch. 9, § 12) (imposing a penalty on persons refusing to attend
after service of process and tender of expense).
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torney-client relationship. 181 By the 1600s, a spousal privilege was
recognized at common law and was available in both civil and
criminal cases. 182 These privileges, however, were not absolute
and exceptions to both arose during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.

183

In 1810, Judge Zephaniah Swift published A Digest of the Law
of Evidence, the first American authoritative source of evidence
law. 184 Swift's treatise reiterated the attorney-client and the
spousal privileges of common law England. 185 During this time,
however, many states had begun to enact privilege statutes to replace the English common law of privileges. 186 The first legislative privilege appeared as early as 1828, when New York created a
statutory physician-patient privilege. 187 By mid-nineteenth century, the common law rules of evidence had begun to dissipate as
88
states conducted statutory revisions of their privilege law. 1
The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize two types of privileges: relational privileges and activity privileges. 189 The most
prominent privileges that emanated from the common law are the
relational privileges-those designed to "protect the integrity of
certain relationships from the scrutiny of judicial process."1 90 A
relationship will be privileged when it is "sufficiently important
that society is willing to sacrifice the production of probative evi181 See Berd v. Lovelace, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (1577). See also Dennis v. Codrington, 21
Enp. Rep. 53 (1580).
18
See Wigmore, supra note 178, § 2227, at 213 & n.12.
183 See Henry Bathurst, The Theory of Evidence 95-96 (London 1761).
184 See Zephaniah Swift, A Digest of the Law of Evidence (1810).
185 Id. at 91-96. Although Smith noted the physician and clergy claims for privileges,
he dismissed them as being unsupported. See id. at 95.
186 Privileged Communications, supra note 176, at 1458. This was done primarily in
response to changing attitudes towards England immediately following the RevolutionaZ war and a popular dissatisfaction with the common law. See id.
See Wigmore, supra note 178, § 2380, at 819.
188 See Privileged Communications, supra note 176, at 1460.
189 See Fed. R. Evid. 501 (recognizing privileges under both federal common law and
state law). See also Note, Making Sense of Rules of Privilege Under the Structural
(I1)logic of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1339, 1341-43 (1992)
[hereinafter Making Sense of Rules of Privilege] (differentiating relational and activity
privilege rules). Activity privileges exclude from admission facts concerning certain extrinsic actions taken by the parties. See id. at 1342.
190 Making Sense of Rules of Privilege, supra note 189, at 1345.
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dence to preserve confidentiality within the relationship,"' 91 the
relationship is dependent upon confidentiality for its vitality, and
the fundamental nature of the relationship will change if confidentiality is not assured. 192 Both federal and state courts have acknowledged several relational privileges: attorney-client; physician-patient; psychotherapist-patient; clergy-communicant; and
marital privileges. 193 The next Subsection will evaluate the application and viability of privilege rules in the context of the blood
bank-donor relationship.
2. Blood Banks and Privilege Law
In addition to asserting a claim of privacy for protection of donor identity in blood litigation, blood banks have also contended
that the blood bank-donor relationship is one that is protected under privilege law. Specifically, they have argued that confidential
information and communications concerning the donor should be
protected under the physician-patient privilege. 194 Currently, only

a few courts have held that an extension of the physician-patient
privilege would be appropriate in the blood bank-donor context. 195
These courts have extended the physician-patient privilege to
blood banks on the basis that the privilege is designed to protect
the privacy of information communicated to the physician by the

patient and to prevent against exposing the patient to embarrassment. 196 They have reasoned that this policy rationale is applicable
191 Id. at 1343.
192 See id. at 1343-44.
193 See Wigmore, supra note 178, § 2285, at 528; Privileged Communications, supra
note 176, at 1501-75 (examining the history, scope and theories of these privileges).
194 See supra text accompanying note 108. Forty-five states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes that recognize a physician-patient privilege to protect
communications relevant for a patient's treatment. See Stephen Aaron Silver, Note, Beyond Jaffee v. Redmond: Should the Federal Courts Recognize a Right to PhysicianPatient Confidentiality?, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1809, 1810-11 n.7 (1998) (listing specific state
statutes).
195 See supra note 108.
196 See Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476-77 (Sup. Ct. 1987). In Krgygier, however, the court based its denial of discovery on the state equivalent of Rule
26(c). See id. at 476. To date, no other court has held the physician-patient privilege applicable when addressing the discovery issue in blood donation litigation. See, e.g.,
Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 609 A.2d 796, 803 (Pa. 1992) (noting that the
Pennsylvania physician-patient privilege statute is limited to "information communicated
to a physician by a patient" and holding that the donor's identity would "potentially be
subjected to the privilege").

HeinOnline -- 7 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 177 1999-2000

178

Virginia Journalof Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 7:2

to the blood bank-donor relationship because the altruistic donor is
subjected to embarrassment and innuendo once a plaintiff has acquired HIV from a pool of donations and the donor's identity has
been implicated. 19 7

The prevailing view, however, is that the blood bank-donor relationship lacks a critical element contemplated by state legislatures when drafting and adopting the physician-patient privilege:
the facilitation of medical treatment. 198 These courts have held the
privilege inapplicable to the blood bank-donor relationship because an extension of the privilege would fail to further the primary goal of treatment of the donor. 199 There are several reasons
for this conclusion. First, the donor's blood is not drawn by a physician. 200 Second, a blood donor is not considered a patient within
the language of the physician-patient privilege statutes. 201 Finally,
the information provided to the blood bank by the donor does not
assist in any manner in providing medical treatment to the donor. 202 In short, these courts have failed to extend the physician-

patient privilege to the blood bank-donor relationship solely because blood banks do not meet the statutory definition of "physician" and do not provide medical treatment as required by the
statute. 203 However, they have continued to find that the donor enjoys a right to privacy against disclosure of personal information, 204 and recognize that openness and candor by blood donors in
answering questions about their medical and personal histories
20 5
should be encouraged.
197
198

See Krygier, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77; Stenger, 609 A.2d at 803.
See Belle Bonfils Mem'l Blood Ctr. v. District Ct., 763 P.2d 1003, 1009 (Colo.

1988); Laburre v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 555 So. 2d 1381, 1384 (La. 1990); Doe v.
University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419, 423 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).

199 See Laburre, 555 So. 2d at 1383 (noting that a principal purpose of the physicianpatient privilege is to "encourage full disclosure by the patient of his symptoms and condition ... in order to ensure proper diagnosis and treatment").
200 See Doe v. University of Cincinnati,538 N.E.2d at 422.
201 See Belle Bonfils Mem'l Blood Ctr., 763 P.2d at 1009; Laburre, 555 So. 2d at
1384; Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d at 422-23.
202 See Laburre, 555 So. 2d at 1384; Doe v. University of Cincinnati,538 N.E.2d at

423.
203 See Belle Bonfils Mem'l Blood Ctr., 763 P.2d at 1009; Laburre, 555 So. 2d at
1384; Doe v. University of Cincinnati,538 N.E.2d at 422-23.

204
205

See Doe v. University of Cincinnati,538 N.E.2d at 424.
See Laburre,555 So. 2d at 1384.

HeinOnline -- 7 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 178 1999-2000

2000] Blood, Sweat and Tears: ProtectingDonor Privacy

179

Currently, no jurisdiction has recognized a separate blood
bank-donor privilege. However, for the following reasons, the
blood bank-donor relationship satisfies all of the requisite condi-

tions for the establishment of a privilege and donors should be
granted protection against all subsequent disclosures of communications made to blood bank personnel during donor consultation.
a. The Blood Bank-Donor Relationship Is Critical for Saving
Lives

Under Wigmore's definition, an essential requirement for the
establishment of a privilege is that the relationship is one "which
in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered,"

and where the benefit derived from the relationship outweighs any
detrimental effect on the truth seeking process. 206 The blood banking industry is the largest collector of blood in the country. 20 7 Today, licensed blood establishments include "more than 1,000 donor centers that collect, process and distribute blood and blood
products in interstate commerce ....,"208 Each year, several million units of blood are drawn from volunteer donors to be used to
20 9
save the lives of millions of Americans.

As a result of the critical role that blood plays in the nation's
health care system, the blood bank-donor relationship warrants
that state legislatures grant to donors an absolute privilege to en-

sure that adequate levels of blood will be available at all times and
206 Wigmore, supra note 178, § 2285, at 527. See also Privileged Communications,
supra note 176, at 1472 (discussing Wigmore's definition of privilege).
20, See Jeffrey McCullough, The Nation's Changing Blood Supply System, 269
JAMA 2239, 2239 (1993). See also Protecting the Nation's Blood Supply from Infectious Agents: New Standards to Meet New Threats: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the House Government Reform
and Oversight Comm., 104th Cong. 91 (1995) (prepared statement of Kathryn C. Zoon,
Director, Center for Biologic Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration)
[hereinafter Prepared Statement of Kathryn C. Zoon]. The blood banking industry has
evolved from a "loosely organized medical service into a major manufacturing industry
.....
" Id. Currently, it is comprised of three types of blood establishments: blood banks,
transfusion services, and plasmapheresis centers. See id. Blood banks may operate as
free-standing entities or be associated with hospitals. See id.
208 Monica Revele, Progress in Blood Supply Safety, 29 FDA Consumer 21, 22
1995).
09 See id. at 21. Approximately 40,000 units (pints) of blood are used every day in
the United States. See U.S. Blood Shortages Expected Next Year, Gov't Says, Med. Indus. Today, June 29, 1999.

HeinOnline -- 7 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 179 1999-2000

180

Virginia Journalof Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 7:2

a qualified privilege to prevent blood banks from disclosing confidential information such as donor identities and HIV status during
civil proceedings. 210 Clearly, a compelling concern of federal and
state courts when balancing the competing interests under Rule
26(c) or its state equivalents has been the effect on the national
blood supply of granting discovery of personal information such
as donor identities when associated with the donor's HIV positive
status. 211 More importantly, however, the uniqueness and significance of blood in saving lives has made it a priceless and indispensable commodity both to individuals and society. 212 Thus, in
order to prevent against the potential for future shortages and inadequate supply levels of blood, a sacrifice of the production of
probative evidence to preserve confidentiality within the blood
bank-donor relationship is certainly warranted in light of the utilitarian benefits to society in eliminating all potential inhibitions to
213
donating blood.
b. Confidentiality Is Vital in Maintaining an Effective Blood
Bank-Donor Relationship
In addition, a relationship will be privileged when communications made within the relationship have originated under an expectation of confidentiality that is essential for its continued maintenance and the relationship would suffer injury if the
communications were disclosed. 214 For example, both the attorney-client privilege and the physician-patient privilege operate
under the presumption that full disclosure of the facts is critical for
maintaining the attorney's ability to effectively represent the client 215 and the physician's ability to effectively render diagnosis
210 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text. See also infra Part V, Sections A, B
discussing proposals for an absolute and a qualified privilege).
1 See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
212 See supra text accompanying notes 67-71.
213 See supra notes 89-91 (discussing the potential for a disincentive to give blood under Rule 26(c)).
214 See Wigmore, supra note 178, § 2285, at 527 (noting that confidentiality must be
essential to the satisfactory maintenance of the relationship and that injury to the relationship must occur upon disclosure of communications that have originated in the confidential nature surrounding the relationship).
215 See United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 1977). In
Hodge, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[i]n our legal system the client should make full
disclosure to the attorney so that the advice given is sound, so that the attorney can give
all appropriate protection to the client's interest, and so that proper defenses are raised if
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and medical treatment to the patient. 216 To achieve the disclosure
of facts necessary in rendering effective service within these relationships, communications made during the course of these relationships have been deemed confidential. 217 Thus, society has concluded that the attorney-client, and physician-patient relationships
would suffer significantly in the absence of a privilege and clients
and patients would be discouraged from confiding in their lawyers
or doctors.
Similar to attorney-client or physician-patient relationships,
218
confidentiality is an essential consideration in blood donation.
Communications made to blood banks by donors during the donation process originate under an expectation of confidentiality by
both donors and blood banks. Even prior to 1985, blood banks
throughout the United States consistently operated under a longstanding practice of maintaining the privacy of information concerning blood donors. 219 In 1985, the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Health and the Environment held hearings
on the issue of blood donor confidentiality. 220 All witnesses who
litigation results." Id. See also Privileged Communications, supra note 176, at 1503 (noting that a later justification for the attorney-client privilege was to "assure the client of
the effective legal assistance of a well-informed trial attorney").
216 See Laburre v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 555 So. 2d 1381, 1383 (La. 1990) (noting that "[a] principal purpose of the physician-patient privilege is to encourage full disclosure by the patient of his symptoms and condition to the physician in order to ensure
roper diagnosis and treatment.").
17 See Wigmore, supra note 178, § 2306, at 588 (noting that under the attorney-client
privilege, "communications" will include both words uttered by the client and acts that
are voluntarily disclosed and made known to the attorney.) See also id. § 2383, at 842;
Privileged Communications, supra note 176, at 1534 (noting that under the physicianpatient privilege, confidential communications will include all information obtained by
the physician in the course of treatment, whether verbally from the patient or directly
through observation).
218 See Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 538 N.E.2d 419, 425 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
219 See Taylor v. West Penn Hosp., 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178, 187-88 (Ct. C.P. Allegheny
County 1987) (referring to the 1985 hearings on blood donor confidentiality conducted
by the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Health and Environment).
220 See id. at 187 (citing Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the Committee
on Energy and Commerce of the United States House of Representatives (99th Cong.,
1st Ses., Serial No. 99-45, pp. 111-202)). Witnesses appearing before the Subcommittee
included: "Dr. Frank E. Young, Commissioner of Food and Drugs of the Department of
Health and Human Services; Dr. Edward N. Brandt, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of
Health; [and] Dr. Joseph R. Bove, Professor of Laboratory Medicine at Yale University
School of Medicine and Chairman of the Committee on Transfusion Transmitted Diseases of the American Association of Blood Banks ..." Id. at 187-88.
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appeared before the subcommittee uniformly testified that maintaining the confidentiality of blood donors had been a longstanding practice of blood collection entities throughout the United
22
States. '
During the blood donation process, a donor often receives
written assurances from blood bank personnel that any information
she furnishes will remain confidential. 222 Blood banks typically
advise donors that their blood will be tested for diseases, that donors will be notified in the event that the test results indicate the
detection of a disease, and the information will not be disclosed to
any other person outside of the donation process. 223 Even without
these assurances, however, the average donor expects that any information the blood bank obtains concerning her will be treated as
224
confidential.
Also similar to the attorney-client and physician-patient relationships, the donor and blood bank's expectations of confidentiality are critical for maintaining the blood bank-donor relationship.
Unfortunately, the donor who altruistically donates her blood is
exposed to embarrassment and innuendo once a recipient has acquired an infectious disease such as HIV and the donor has been
identified. 225 As a result, the donor may be discouraged from providing open and candid answers to questions concerning her medical and personal history. An honest and open dialogue between
blood bank technicians and donors could provide a critical level of
protection in cases where donated blood is HIV-infected but escapes detection by either ELISA or the Western Blot Analysis be226
cause the donation occurred during the window period.
Just as a patient and client receive the primary benefits of effective medical treatment by a physician or representation by an
attorney, donors also receive several primary benefits during the
221 See id. at 188. See also Ellison v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 151 F.R.D. 8, 10
(D.N.H. 1993) (discussing former FDA Commissioner Frank E. Young's testimony concerning the blood products community's policies and procedures for confidentiality in
the treatment of donor information).
222
223

See West Penn. Hosp., 48 Pa. D. & C.3d at 187.
See id.

224
225
226

See id.
See Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476-77 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
See supra note 11.
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course of the blood bank-donor relationship. Blood banks provide
donors with the important health benefit of being informed of their
HIV status through test results and initial HLV counseling. 227 They
receive thousands of test results that are positive for HIV and other
diseases each day. 228 Although many of the test results are false
positives, blood banks provide counseling and advice to the donor
and develop records such as donor deferral registries designed to
prevent any subsequent donations by the donor. 229 It is unquestionable that early detection and treatment of HIV can result in a
longer and better quality of life for the donor and when combined
with specific medical treatments, the possible elimination of HIV
230
altogether.
Finally, the nature of the blood bank-donor relationship would
change drastically if current presumptions and expectations of
confidentiality of blood banks and donors were removed from the
donation process. A primary goal of the blood bank-donor relationship is to ensure an adequate and safe supply of blood and
blood components from volunteer donors. 23' Confidentiality assists blood banks in achieving these goals in two ways. First, the
safety of a unit of blood for transfusion is determined by serological testing of blood and donor health history screening. 232 Ensuring confidentiality promotes the safety of the blood supply by creating an atmosphere in which donors will feel free to be
completely honest and accurate in discussing their health histories
227 See Gordon Slovut, Blood Given by Family and Friends is Not Safer, 'U' Expert
Says,
228 Minn. Star Trib., May 5, 1993, at A21.
See id.

229 See id. See also McCullough, supra note 207, at 2241 (describing the donor deferral registry process).
230 Recent research has demonstrated that AIDS may not be invincible. See Philip
Elmer-Dewitt, Turning the Tide, Time, Dec. 30, 1996, at 54. During 1997, Dr. David Ho
and his research team made a major breakthrough in the study of HIV. Dr. Ho reported
on an experiment he had conducted which indicated that by administering proteaseinhibitor cocktails to HIV patients in the earliest stages of infection, the patients experienced remarkable recoveries. See id. at 54. During a press conference to report on his
findings, Dr. Ho explained that under the right conditions, his experiment might eliminate HIV from a small group of men treated within three months of infection. See Christine Gorman, The Disease Detective, Time, Dec. 30, 1996, at 58.
231 See National Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 32702, 32702 (1974). See also Karen
Shoos Lipton, Blood Donor Services and Liability Issues Relating to Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome, 7 J. Legal Med. 131, 161 (1986).
232 See supra text accompanying notes 47-55.
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without the fear that personal information might be later disclosed
to persons outside of the donation process. 233 Second, confidentiality promotes the adequacy of the blood supply by ensuring that
donors will not be deterred from donating blood on the basis that
information which may adversely affect their "employment, insurand personal relationships
ability, reputation in the community,
234
will be publicly disclosed.
Although policy makers have designated the donation of blood
as a "service," it is not a requirement. 235 Not only would many donors, including those who are disease-free, be less likely to provide candid answers to personal questions if their communications
could be revealed and disclosed in subsequent lawsuits against
them, many would likely refrain from giving blood altogether. Despite the lack of anecdotal evidence to support this point, both
would be reasonable responses in a society where blood donation
is not mandatory. 236 Under a simple cost-benefit analysis, the
benefits attributed to providing a service to individuals in need of
blood transfusions would be easily outweighed by the cost and expense to the donor of disclosure of the donor's identity and HIV
2 37
status in litigation, should the donor's blood be disease-infected.
These potential responses by donors would certainly result in cir233 See Lipton, supra note 231, at 161.
234 Id.
235 For purposes of strict liability and breach of warranty claims, most state legislatures have enacted "blood shield" statutes, which characterize the transfusion of blood as
a medical service rather than a product. See Kathryn W. Pieplow, Comment, AIDS,
Blood Banks, and the Courts: The Legal Response to Transfusion-Acquired Disease, 38
S.D. L. Rev. 609, 622-24 (1993) (discussing and listing the various blood shield statutes). In the absence of the sale of a product, neither strict liability in tort nor breach of
warranty claims are applicable. See id. at 622-23.
236 See National Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 32702, 32702 (1974) (seeking to accelerate the development of an all-voluntary supply of blood); Prepared Statement of Kathryn
C. Zoon, supra note 207, at 87 (indicating that each year approximately 12 million units
of blood are drawn from volunteer donors).
237 The effect of disclosure of this information has had a devastating effect on the
lives of donors. Not only does the stigma attached to a disclosure of HIV positive status
affect the employment and insurability of the donor, the donor is often subjected to extreme ostracism by family members, friends and society. See Rasmussen v. South Fla.
Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987) (referring to HIV as the "modem day
equivalent of leprosy" and concluding that HIV infection or a suspicion of HIV can lead
to "discrimination in employment, education, housing and even medical treatment"). See
also McCullough, supra note 207, at 2242 (noting that an HIV positive screening test
result may have a negative effect on an individual's employment and insurability).
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cumventing the primary goals of the blood bank-donor relationship and would result in devastation for those individuals in desperate need of blood transfusions.
In summary, the same policy rationales for holding communications made within the attorney-client and physician-patient relationships confidential are appropriate for communications made
within the blood bank-donor relationship. The promotion of candor and openness by donors in answering questions regarding their
medical and personal histories benefits all of society. 238 Creating
an environment in which donors will provide blood banks with
sufficient personal information regarding their medical histories
and backgrounds is necessary to further ensure the safety of the
current and future blood supply, and to provide donors with the
earliest possible detection of HIV for treatment purposes.
V. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF A DONOR PRIVILEGE: TWO PROPOSALS

FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY

To ensure the maximum protection for donor privacy and to
promote the National Blood Policy, state legislatures should adopt
an absolute donor privilege to protect donors during the donation
process and a qualified blood bank-donor privilege to protect
against disclosure of donor identity and confidential medical information in subsequent litigation. In this Part, the Article presents
two specific proposals and explains how each will provide sufficient safeguards for privacy while promoting a liberal discovery.
Finally, the Article explains how the proposals will assist in eliminating many of the current problems in applying Rule 26(c).
A. Blood Donor Privilege-BloodDonation and Collection
ProposalL The voluntaryfurnishing and donating of whole blood,
blood products and organs is declared to be, for the purpose of injecting or transfusing into the human body for any objective whatsoever, the rendition of a service. No person participatingin rendering such services shall be liablefor civil damages at any time.

238

See Laburre v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 555 So. 2d 1381, 1384 (La. 1990).
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Proposal I provides the voluntary blood donor with the same
protection that blood banks currently enjoy in the blood collection
process. 239 It is modeled after state blood shield statutes 240 and is
designed to prohibit the subsequent civil prosecution in tort
against all donors by any recipient of disease-infected blood or
blood products. 24 1 For purposes of breach of warranty and strict
liability in tort claims, almost all state legislatures have determined
that blood banks enjoy an absolute privilege when collecting blood
to be supplied for use by hospitals in medical treatment. 24 2 To implement this policy, state legislators have enacted blood shield
statutes that expressly provide that the collection and supplying of
blood by blood banks is a service and not a product, thus acknowledging the critical importance and role that blood plays in the na243
tion's health care system.
Because blood transfusions remain critical for saving lives and
there are no viable long-term substitutes for blood in medical
treatments, 244 the blood donation process must also be given similar protection to ensure against any impediments to maintaining
adequate levels of blood at all times. This protection is especially
important in light of current predictions that the United States will
experience significant shortages in the national blood supply as

239

Because payment for blood creates a greater incentive for persons to knowingly

and willfully donate disease-infected blood, protection under Proposal I is limited only to
the voluntary donor.

240

See supra note 235 (discussing blood shield statutes). For example, the language of

the Horida Exclusion or Modification of Warranties statute provides:

The procurement, processing, storage, distribution, or use of whole
blood, plasma, blood products, and blood derivatives for the purpose

of injecting or transfusing the same, or any of them, into the human
body for any purpose whatsoever is declared to be the rendering of a
service by any person participating therein and does not constitute a
sale ... and the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for
a particular purpose are not applicable ....
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 672.316(5) (West 1993). See also Idaho Code § 39-3702 (1998); Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 65-3701 (1992).
241
For this discussion, the term "recipient" will include not only the plaintiff who receives disease-infected blood or blood products during her medical treatment, but also
blood banks, hospitals, or state governmental entities (e.g., state operated blood banks or
hospitals) that collect and transfuse blood.

242

See supra note 235.

243
244

See id.
See Pieplow, supra note 235, at 613 n. 17.
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early as this year. 245 Therefore, the creation of an absolute privilege to protect activities involving blood would simply entail extending the current privilege given in the blood collection process
to the blood donation process.
Adopting an absolute privilege to protect donors in the donation process will have several major benefits. First, it would ensure
the maximum protection for donor privacy because personal and
confidential information provided by the donor during the donation process could never be used against the donor in subsequent
civil actions. Second, an absolute donor privilege would further
promote the National Blood Policy's goal of providing an adequate supply of blood. 246 Specifically, the privilege would create
an atmosphere conducive for candor and accuracy during the donor screening process. Donors would no longer have to fear that
personal information provided during the blood bank screening
process could ultimately be disclosed and used against them in
later lawsuits, thus alleviating any potential inhibitions that donors
might have towards donating blood. Third, the absolute donor
privilege would extend not only to those voluntary donors who
unknowingly provide HIV-infected blood, but to any altruistic donor who may be infected with a bloodbome disease. Consequently, the privilege would provide the necessary flexibility for
protecting voluntary donors from liability for new diseases that
may occur in the future.
An absolute donor privilege would prevent any subsequent tort
actions against the voluntary donor who donates disease-infected
blood and would eliminate any potential inhibitions for giving
blood that currently exist when applying Rule 26(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 247 However, it would not prevent the
245 See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
246 See National Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 32702, 32702 (1974).
247 Currently, the plaintiff can elect to sue both the blood bank and the donor for negligence, or the HIV-infected donor for fraud, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See supra note 17 (discussing negligence claims). See also Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1387-1400 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (discussing the plaintiff's claims
for fraud, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress for receiving HIV during sexual relations with the defendant). My proposal would eliminate all tort actions
against the donor, but would not affect the plaintiff's ability to sue the blood bank under
tort law. Because blood banks are the collectors and distributors of blood donations, they
are in the best position to screen individual donors through questions and observations,
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State, on behalf of its citizens, from filing criminal actions against
the donor who knowingly and willfully provides disease-infected
blood.2 48 Therefore, the State would retain an appropriate legal
249
remedy against the non-altruistic donor.
B. Blood Bank-Donor Privilege
ProposalII. Unless the donor waives the privilege, or in civil suits
where the plaintiffhas demonstratedadequate necessity andjustification for the information, a blood bank or its authorized personnel shall not be allowed to disclose any communication made,
or information acquired, during consultation with the donor in a
professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable the
blood bank to act in that capacity.
Proposal II provides a qualified protection of confidential information communicated to the blood bank by the donor when the
information is provided in the course of the donor screening process. It is modeled after state physician-patient privilege statutes 250
and is no more than a codification of the existing protocol and expectations of confidentiality that currently operate during the
and surrogate testing of blood prior to distribution.
248 Several states have enacted criminal statutes penalizing the exposure of others to
HIV. For example, the Illinois Criminal Transmission of HIV statute, Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 5/12-16.2 (West 1999) provides: "(a) A person commits criminal transmission of
HIV when he or she, knowing that he or she is infected with HIV... (2) transfers, donates, or provides his or her blood, tissue, semen, organs, or other potentially infectious
body fluids for transfusion, transplantation, insemination, or other administration to another...." See also Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-123(b) (Michie 1999); Ga. Code Ann. § 165-60(c)(5) (1999); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43.5(B) (West 1997); Md. Code Ann., HealthGeneral § 18-601.1(a) (1999); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 333.5210(1) (West 1999); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 191.677.1 (West Supp. 1999); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-18-112 (1999); S.C. Code
Ann. § 44-29-145(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-109(a)(2)
1997).
49 See supra note 173 (defining "altruistic donor").
250 For example, the New York physician-patient privilege statute provides:
Confidential information privileged. Unless the patient waives the
privilege, a person authorized to practice medicine, registered professional nursing, licensed practical nursing, dentistry, podiatry or
chiropractic shall not be allowed to disclose any information which
he acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity, and
which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4504 (McKinney Supp. 2000). See also Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2317.02(B)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1998); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 5929 (West 1982).
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251
blood donation process.

Similar to other relational privileges, the blood bank-donor
privilege may be waived by the beneficiary of the privilege (in this
case the blood donor). A plaintiff also may obtain discovery of the
donor's medical or personal information upon a showing of necessity and justification. 252 The heightened proof requirement contained in the blood bank-donor privilege is consistent with current
legislative policies that allow access to a person's HIV test results
through a court order when the plaintiff has shown a compelling
need for the information. 253 Finally, necessity and justification
would be satisfied by a demonstration of a substantial need for the
materials and that the plaintiff is unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the information by other
means.2 54 For example, in negligence suits against a blood bank,
the substantial need requirement would require more than merely a
naked claim that the plaintiff needs access to the donor's identity
and personal history in order to determine the blood bank's screen-

251 See supra text accompanying notes 219-224.
252 The use of the heightened proof requirement is taken from the Supreme Court's
discussion of the attorney work-product privilege in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
510 (1947). In Hickman, the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of whether notes taken
by the defendant's attorney during interviews with witnesses to a tug boat accident that
were made in preparation for litigation, were discoverable under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See id. at 498-500. The Court held that the privacy of an attorney's
work product was critical for the proper preparation of a client's case and that a party
seeking to invade this privacy during the discovery process had the burden of demonstrating necessity and justification for the information. See id. at 511-12. The Hickman
Court noted that in the work-product context, this standard can be met by demonstrating
that the relevant facts are essential to the preparation of the plaintiff's case or that witnesses are no longer available or can be reached only with difficulty. See id. at 511.
253 See supra note 65 (listing state HIV confidentiality statutes). Although state HIV
confidentiality statutes place the burden of proof on the plaintiff, they generally require
that the court balance the competing interests at stake before granting access to a person's HIV test results. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 381.004(3)(e)(9)(a) (West 1999). Ironically, the interests to be balanced are virtually identical to those considered under the
Rule 26(c) analysis.
254 In defining "necessity and justification," I borrow from the language of Rule
26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Rule
26(b)(3) codifies the principles discussed in Hickman v. Taylor and provides that the attorney's work product is discoverable only upon the plaintiff's demonstration of a substantial need for the materials or that the materials or their equivalents cannot be obtained without undue hardship. See id. advisory committee's note (discussing the 1970
Amendments to Rule 26).
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ing process used at the time of the blood donation. 255 The plaintiff
would be required to make a prima facie showing that information
contained in the donor medical and personal histories was relevant
and necessary for establishing an important element in the plain256
tiffs case.
In satisfying the undue hardship requirement, the plaintiff
would be required to demonstrate that she cannot acquire the requested information in some other way. 257 For example, the plaintiff could access information concerning the blood bank's screening procedures by requesting a copy of all questions or
information posed or disseminated by the blood bank to the donor
during the screening process. 258 The plaintiff may also be able to
access this information by questioning the blood bank lab techni259
cian or employee who withdrew the donation or the donor.
Therefore, this element would require a showing that the donor or
blood bank technician is either deceased or can no longer be
255 See Most v. Tulane Med. Ctr., 576 So. 2d 1387, 1388 (La. 1991) (holding that this
claim was sufficient alone to allow the plaintiff access to the donor's identity).
256 See Ugo Colella, HIV-Related Information and the Tension Between Confidentiality and Liberal Discovery: The Need for a Uniform Approach, 16 J. Legal Med. 33, 45
(1995) (indicating that "[t]he threshold question in any discovery dispute involving HIVrelated information should be whether the information is critical to the requesting party's
case."). Without seeing the file, however, the plaintiff would only be able to speculate as
to its contents. Therefore, to overcome the substantial need requirement, she would only
have to demonstrate the possibility, and not the certainty, that the claimed documents
would contain evidence of the blood bank's negligence. See Logan v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 977 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that in a bad faith action against an
insurance carrier where documents requested by the plaintiff were protected by the workproduct privilege, the plaintiff had to demonstrate some likelihood or probability that the
documents could contain evidence of bad faith).
257 See Director, Office of Thrift Supervision v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 124 F.3d
1304, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that "[u]ndue hardship asks whether the moving
Nart can acquire the information any other way.").
See Boutte v. Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122, 123 (W.D. La. 1989) (noting that
the blood bank provided the plaintiff with copies of the donor's interview questionnaire
and the results of tests performed on the unit of blood donated).
259 See supra text accompanying notes 100-01. To protect the privacy of the donor,
the court could require that the donor be questioned through interrogatories or an
anonymous deposition. See Watson v. Medical Univ. of S.C., 974 F.2d 482, 484 (4th
Cir. 1992) (allowing the plaintiff to submit written questions to a court appointed attorney for the donor); Boutte, 127 F.R.D. at 126 (allowing the plaintiff to question the donor through an anonymous deposition). Finally, the court could require that the donor's
answers to interrogatories or deposition be filed under seal with the court. See Watson,
974 F.2d at 490.
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reached. 260 Finally, once the plaintiff has established the requisite
showing of proof, the court could conduct an in camera examination of the donor's records in order to preserve their confidentiality
and to determine if they contain any evidence of negligence by the
blood bank. 26 1 After being satisfied that the documents contain
evidence of negligence, the court could order that all references to
the donor in the documents be redacted. 262 It could also require the
substitution of a pseudonym for the name of the donor in all dis263
covery and trial pleadings.
Similar to Proposal I, adopting a qualified blood bank-donor
privilege is also beneficial to both the donor and society. First, the
blood bank-donor privilege would eliminate the need for the current judicial balancing of the respective interests under Rule 26(c)
because blood banks could legitimately assert a privilege that
would exempt donor communications from general discovery altogether. 264 Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires
that federal courts recognize and apply state privilege law when
exercising diversity jurisdiction. 265 Therefore, the recognition of a
legislative privilege by federal district courts would create uniformity in the handling of the donor's privacy interest, thus eliminating the judicial inconsistencies and possible Erie concerns that
arise when applying Rule 26(c).
Second, unlike the federal discovery rules where plaintiffs enjoy the presumption of a liberal and broad discovery, 26 6 the adoption of a blood bank-donor privilege would create the presumption
that information obtained and disclosed during the relationship is
confidential and non-discoverable. The heightened proof requirement contained in the privilege provides an additional layer of protection for the donor's privacy while allowing for the discovery of
the requested information only upon the requisite showing by the
260 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
261 See Logan, 96 F.3d at 977.
262 See Watson, 974 F.2d at 484 (noting that the blood bank provided the plaintiff with
a redacted copy of the donor's screening questionnaire).
263 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 381.004(3)(e)(9)(b) (West Supp. 2000) (requiring the substitution of a pseudonym for the name of the subject of an HIV test when a court has ordered disclosure of the test results).
264 See supra notes 56, 59 (discussing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), (c)).
265

SeeFed. R. Evid. 501.

266

See supra text accompanying notes 93-96 (discussing discovery).
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plaintiff. Unlike under Rule 26(c) where the burden to defend confidentiality was placed on the blood bank, the plaintiff would have
to demonstrate both requirements before a court could grant access
to the donor's medical and background histories. Consequently,
shifting the burden of proof to the plaintiff would ensure that donors always receive a basic level of protection for privacy
throughout the screening process and promote the goals of a broad
and liberal discovery as envisioned by the drafters of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Third, the blood bank-donor privilege would also foster an atmosphere conducive for openness and candor by donors in responding to questions concerning their medical histories and other
personal information. Candid responses by donors would ultimately work towards promoting the National Blood Policy's goals
of creating both a safe and adequate blood supply by providing the
assurance that information provided during the relationship is confidential. 267 Finally, once a plaintiff has demonstrated necessity
and justification under the blood bank-donor privilege, the absolute donor privilege under Proposal I would shield the altruistic
donor from all subsequent civil liability where the donor's identity
has been either inadvertently or purposefully disclosed in violation
26 8
of a confidentiality order.
CONCLUSION

As we enter the third decade of the AIDS epidemic, HIV infection through blood transfusions continues to raise legitimate health
and legal concerns. However, neither the privacy of blood donors
nor the discovery of information necessary to establish a plaintiff's
negligence claim against a blood bank has to be jeopardized. In relationships where society has concluded that communications
made between the parties are essential for furthering those relationships, the judiciary and the legislature have recognized privileges against disclosure of such communications in private litigation. The critical role that blood plays in the nation's health care
267

See National Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 32702, 32702 (1974).

268 See supra note 171 (illustrating the need for a sufficient judicial remedy for
breaches of confidentiality orders designed to prevent disclosure of the identity of the
HIV-infected donor).

HeinOnline -- 7 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 192 1999-2000

2000] Blood, Sweat and Tears: ProtectingDonor Privacy

193

industry warrants the adoption of an absolute privilege to protect
individuals who donate blood and a qualified blood bank-donor
privilege to protect against the disclosure of confidential information disseminated during the donor screening process.
The giving of blood continues to be the "gift of life" for those
who desperately need it. Yet, in hindsight, the judiciary's treatment of the discovery of donor identities and health-related information in blood bank litigation has too often neglected the legitimate privacy concerns of blood donors. Today, even the altruistic
donor is subject to legal actions by a recipient of a transfusion
should any disease infect her blood. In light of the epidemic proportions of individuals infected by HIV each year, the stigmatization that continues to plague the victims of the disease and their
families, and the decreased concerns for blood safety, state legislatures have the responsibility to institute even greater protection for
the privacy of their citizens. This can be done while continuing to
effectively safeguard a plaintiff's right to access relevant information critical for litigation and society's interest in a safe and adequate blood supply.
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